In the past days, rumors have circulated about the imminent demise of Iran’s Supreme Leader. Whether true or not, the Assembly of Experts, the council responsible for appointing Khamenei’s successor, convened this week to elect a new chairman. Might a new head of state lead Iran in a different direction? Ali Alfoneh thinks not:

Mohammad Yazdi, a hardline ayatollah and former judiciary chief, was elected chairman of Iran’s Assembly of Experts. . . . Yazdi is also among the leading candidates to replace Ali Khamenei. . . . Should he succeed, Yazdi is likely to continue the example of his predecessor by expanding the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in Iran’s foreign and security policies. . . .

[It is also possible that] Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the Islamic Republic’s founder, may emerge as the surprise frontrunner in the so-called pragmatic camp of former president Hashemi] Rafsanjani and current president Hassan Rouhani. Rafsanjani and the young Khomeini may genuinely try to liberalize Iran’s economy and continue Rouhani’s attempts at bringing the country out of isolation, but are not likely to have a security policy much different from that of the current supreme leader.

It is difficult to prophesy the outcome of Iran’s current power struggle, but given the likely candidates to lead the country, one scenario may be safely ruled out: that Khamenei’s eventual demise will usher in a moderate Islamic Republic at peace with the world.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.