This week marks the seventh year since the imprisonment of seven Baha’i leaders by the Islamic Republic. The Baha’i—whose religion is an offshoot of Islam founded in 19th-century Persia—have been subject to systematic repression since the 1979 revolution. Elliott Abrams writes:

The persecution [of the Baha’i] continues to increase—including since the election of the supposed reformer Hassan Rouhani as president in 2013. For example, there were 57 Baha’i in prison in 2011, but by January 2014 the number had reached 136 (in addition to hundreds more awaiting trial or sentencing). . . . And state-controlled media have greatly increased their attacks on the Baha’i: instead of once every day or two in previous years, last year attacks were running an amazing average of 400 per month. . . .

The Baha’i have no clergy and have self-governing communities with ad-hoc leaders. Their informal leadership group in Iran . . . was arrested in May 2008 and sent to Tehran’s notorious Evin prison. There these seven men and women remain today, seven years later. They’ve been charged with espionage, cooperation with Israel, and “spreading corruption on earth,” among other crimes. They were tried in closed sessions in 2010. One of the lawyers who tried to represent them, Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi, says there was no evidence against them—nor did they get a fair trial. But all seven were sentenced to twenty-year terms.

On this seventh anniversary of their incarceration, it’s worth remembering the viciousness and the deceit with which the Iran continues to treat its peaceful Baha’i citizens. The truth about life in the Islamic Republic is revealed not by the smooth diplomats it sends abroad for international negotiations, but by the suffering of these peaceful and vulnerable citizens.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.