To their ever-growing list of demands, Iranian negotiators in Vienna have added a new one: ending UN sanctions on the Islamic Republic’s ballistic-missile program. Michael Eisenstadt explains the danger:

Since [1988], missiles have been central to Iran’s way of war, which emphasizes the need to avoid or deter conventional conflict while advancing [the regime’s] anti-status-quo agenda via proxy operations and propaganda activities. . . . Missiles enable Iran to [bombard] civilian population centers and undermine enemy morale. If their accuracy increases in the future, they could further stress enemy defenses (as every incoming missile would have to be intercepted) and enable Iran to target military facilities and critical infrastructure. . . .

In this context, rockets are as important as missiles, since they yield the same psychological effect on the targeted population. The manner in which Hizballah and Hamas used rockets in their recent wars with Israel provides a useful template for understanding the role of conventionally armed missiles in Iran’s war-fighting doctrine.

Missiles . . . are a central fixture of just about every [Iranian] military parade, frequently dressed with banners calling for “death to America” and declaring that “Israel should be wiped off the map.” . . . And as the delivery system of choice for nuclear weapons, . . . they are a key element of Iran’s nascent doctrine of nuclear ambiguity and its attempts at “nuclear intimidation without the bomb.”

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.