The agreement with Iran concerning its nuclear program is designed, writes Jeffrey Herf, to constrain America’s ability to respond to any cheating on Tehran’s part. And that is only the tip of an iceberg of problems:

[T]he agreement embeds the United States in a web of multilateral processes that place significant and perhaps insuperable obstacles to both a “snapback” of economic sanctions and . . . an American military strike should Iran be found in violation [of its terms]. It [also] creates . . . economic interests on the part of other countries, and perhaps our own as well, that will [encourage them] to give Iran the benefit of the doubt in such instances.

It [also] enhances the veto power of other states, including our allies, over possible American action. By intentionally embedding American decision-making in complex and time-consuming multilateral processes, it is a crowning achievement for those who oppose the unilateral use of American power. Should Congress fail to override a promised presidential veto, we will be living with an agreement that has no effective enforcement mechanism. . . .

Should this or a future president of the United States conclude that intensified economic sanctions or a military strike from the air are the only ways to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, he will have to do so in the face of a coalition pleading for inaction composed of both our adversaries and, most probably, our allies as well. It would be a coalition fostered by the very terms of this agreement.

Robert Satloff has some harsh words for the U.S. government in this regard, words I take especially seriously because Satloff is someone inclined to political moderation. Why, he asks, have American diplomats failed to achieve anything in their endless rounds of talks in Doha and Cairo? Because

there is simply not enough pressure on Hamas to change course, accept a deal, and release the remaining October 7 hostages, stuck in nightmarish captivity. . . . In this environment, why should Hamas change course?

Publicly, the U.S. should bite the bullet and urge Israel to complete the main battle operations in Gaza—i.e., the Rafah operation—as swiftly and efficiently as possible. We should be assertively assisting with the humanitarian side of this.

Satloff had more to say about the hostages, especially the five American ones, in a speech he gave recently:

I am ashamed—ashamed of how we have allowed the story of the hostages to get lost in the noise of the war that followed their capture; ashamed of how we have permitted their release to be a bargaining chip in some larger political negotiation; ashamed of how we have failed to give them the respect and dignity and our wholehearted demand for Red Cross access and care and medicine that is our normal, usual demand for hostages.

If they were taken by Boko Haram, everyone would know their name. If they were taken by the Taliban, everyone would tie a yellow ribbon around a tree for them. If they were taken by Islamic State, kids would learn about them in school.

It is repugnant to see their freedom as just one item on the bargaining table with Hamas, as though they were chattel. These are Americans—and they deserve to be backed by the full faith and credit of the United States.