In testimony before the Senate, Walter Russell Mead argues that the greatest flaws in the agreement with Iran lie outside its ability (or inability) to keep the Islamic Republic from acquiring nuclear weapons. According to Mead, the crucial question is whether the deal empowers Iran in its quest to dominate the Middle East:

Whatever the agreement does in terms of the nuclear program, when it comes to the conventional balance in the region, it appears to strengthen Iran. . . . The inevitable increase in Iranian conventional resources and capabilities . . . can damage American interests in three ways. First, if Iran devotes even some of its gains from the agreements to its regional allies and hegemonic goals, it could create a major crisis in the region that would require massive American intervention to avoid the danger of having one country dominate the oil wealth of the entire Persian Gulf. Some countries would be endangered directly by subversion or conflict; others, increasingly surrounded by Iranian clients and allies, would feel the need to align their foreign policies and their oil production and pricing strategies with Iran. The United States could be faced with a triumphalist Iranian regime that would be able to manipulate world oil prices and supplies. . . .

Second, fear of Iran can drive American allies and other actors in the region to actions that destabilize the region or run counter to American interests. Concerns about potential proliferation among other regional countries who want to balance the Iranian nuclear program are one example of the potential “blowback” from the agreement. But there are others. Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing Gulf states could, for example, “circle the wagons” among Sunni states, tightening their links with military and intelligence services in countries like Egypt and Pakistan in ways that undercut important American goals. . . .

More broadly, fear of a rising Iran increases the incentives for rich individuals and states to deepen their links with fanatical organizations and fighters. Fanatical anti‐Shiite fighters may, from an American standpoint, be terrorists who are as anti‐Western as they are anti‐Iran. If Iran’s regional power is seen as rising, however, many in the Sunni world will be tempted to support these organizations as indispensable allies in the fight against Iran. Finally, the perception . . . that Iran now has tacit American support in its quest for regional hegemony will act as a powerful recruiting incentive for radical Sunni jihadist groups.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.