Since January, writes Elliott Abrams, President Obama has resorted to insinuations that only dual loyalty or the malign influence of pro-Israel lobbyists could persuade someone to object to his proposed nuclear agreement with Iran. These insinuations became most stark in his speech last week at American University:

The basic idea is simple: to oppose the president’s Iran deal means you want war with Iran, you’re an Israeli agent, you are in the pay of Jewish donors, and you are abandoning the best interests of the United States. [As the president put it in his speech last Wednesday], “congressional rejection of this deal leaves . . . one option, another war in the Middle East.” . . .

Who are these people who, [the president suggested], will be “demanding” war? The “voices being raised against this deal” are those same big donors he mentioned back in January. And AIPAC. And the American Jewish Committee and the American Jewish Congress. And Jewish members of Congress like Chuck Schumer and Eliot Engel and Ted Deutch. And it’s not just that war would be inevitable, you see: it’s that those people would be demanding war, and are behind what he called “the drumbeat of war.”

Why would these people opposing the deal be doing that? It’s their “affinity for our friend and ally Israel.” But we have to resist their arguments: “as president of the United States it would be an abrogation of my constitutional duty to act against my best judgment simply because it causes temporary friction with a dear friend and ally.” It is implicit, and very close to explicit, here that the other side wants the U.S. president to act not on our own country’s behalf but on Israel’s. This is an echo of the old “dual-loyalty” charge that has been lodged against American Jews since the day the state of Israel was established. . . .

And now Barack Obama joins the chorus. . . . His American University speech was an eloquent denunciation of those who disagree with him as warmongers with dual loyalty, who will be “demanding” war with Iran. This speech divides Americans not according to principled opinions, nor even by party, but mostly by religion. It shows disrespect for critics and lowers the tone of the important debate over Iran, but that is not its worst attribute. Once again, it shows President Obama as the divider—willing to use arguments that may or may not help him win this summer’s [debate over the Iran deal] but will surely leave an ugly mark on American politics.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.