As far as the Western powers are concerned, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has been concluded and is going into effect. As far as the Islamic Republic is concerned, however, nothing is final; indeed, argues Lawrence Franklin, its government already may be planning to walk away from the deal:

The publication of [a] letter of October 21 by Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, to Iran’s president, Hassan Rouhani, leaves little doubt that Iran is now demanding fundamental changes to the JCPOA. The conditions spelled out by Khamenei will derail the timetable for the document’s implementation probably beyond President Obama’s term of office. In part, Tehran most likely wants to embarrass the U.S. and President Obama personally by denying him a legacy-related political victory, just as Tehran apparently wants to embarrass them by arresting yet another American hostage two weeks ago, the American-Iranian business executive Siamak Namazi. The [number] of Americans imprisoned in Iran is now five. . . .

It is probably safe to assume that the Western negotiators of the JCPOA have been introduced to the Middle Eastern-bazaar method of negotiation: after an agreement has been concluded, it becomes a basis for further demands.

If Iran succeeds in garnering the benefits of even partial relief of sanctions, and if it attracts additional foreign investment as well as increased international commerce, it will ignore the JCPOA altogether. The only improbable question is: will Iran walk away before or after picking up its $150 billion?

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.