Iran Has Shown Little Commitment to Upholding the Nuclear Deal. Will the U.S. Lift Sanctions Anyway?

According to the schedule outlined by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Tehran must now begin to dismantle part of its already existing nuclear program. Once the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verifes that it has done so, sanctions can be lifted. But, write Ayelet Savyon and Yigal Carmon, it seems unlikely this will go as stipulated:

Iran is providing only a show of making progress in its implementation of its obligations. Inactive centrifuges are being transferred from site to site, and not a single active centrifuge has yet been dismantled. Iran has reached agreements with Russia to store its enriched uranium, and documents have been signed with the superpowers for changing the designation of the Arak reactor. But so far Iran has actually met none of its obligations. . . .

Holding back Iran’s implementation is the October 21, 2015 letter from the Iranian supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, to the Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, setting nine new [Iranian] conditions that must be met first.

U.S. representatives have given no indication that the sanctions will be eased or lifted if Iran does not meet its obligations under the JCPOA. However, in his December 15, 2015 statements, . . . the IAEA secretary-general Yukiya Amano hinted at such a possibility. . . .

In the meantime, in his December 16, 2015 address to the nation, Rouhani effusively praised the JCPOA and Iran’s gains under it, and stated that in “January” the sanctions on Iran would be lifted.

Read more at MEMRI

More about: Hassan Rouhani, Iran nuclear program, Iran sanctions, Politics & Current Affairs, U.S. Foreign policy

 

America Has Failed to Pressure Hamas, and to Free Its Citizens Being Held Hostage

Robert Satloff has some harsh words for the U.S. government in this regard, words I take especially seriously because Satloff is someone inclined to political moderation. Why, he asks, have American diplomats failed to achieve anything in their endless rounds of talks in Doha and Cairo? Because

there is simply not enough pressure on Hamas to change course, accept a deal, and release the remaining October 7 hostages, stuck in nightmarish captivity. . . . In this environment, why should Hamas change course?

Publicly, the U.S. should bite the bullet and urge Israel to complete the main battle operations in Gaza—i.e., the Rafah operation—as swiftly and efficiently as possible. We should be assertively assisting with the humanitarian side of this.

Satloff had more to say about the hostages, especially the five American ones, in a speech he gave recently:

I am ashamed—ashamed of how we have allowed the story of the hostages to get lost in the noise of the war that followed their capture; ashamed of how we have permitted their release to be a bargaining chip in some larger political negotiation; ashamed of how we have failed to give them the respect and dignity and our wholehearted demand for Red Cross access and care and medicine that is our normal, usual demand for hostages.

If they were taken by Boko Haram, everyone would know their name. If they were taken by the Taliban, everyone would tie a yellow ribbon around a tree for them. If they were taken by Islamic State, kids would learn about them in school.

It is repugnant to see their freedom as just one item on the bargaining table with Hamas, as though they were chattel. These are Americans—and they deserve to be backed by the full faith and credit of the United States.

Read more at Washington Institute for Near East Policy

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, U.S.-Israel relationship