Those fleeing Syria for Germany come from a country that has been at war with Israel since 1948 and where the government has disseminated anti-Semitic propaganda for decades. Germany, writes Jeffrey Herf, faces a decision: whether simply to allow these refugees to remain in its borders or to take difficult (and necessary) measures to integrate them into its social order. The latter would include encouraging them to shed received ideas about Jews and the Jewish state:

Germany’s successes since 1945 have rested to no small degree on . . . a willingness to learn lessons from past disasters, the rejection of totalitarian ideologies, [and] self-criticism. . . . It may occur to some of the Syrian refugees that decades of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories and hatred of Israel coming from the Baath dictatorship had something to do with the self-destruction that has now engulfed their native land. For this welcome outcome to occur, German intellectuals, scholars, and politicians must teach incoming migrants about the importance of Germany’s tradition of facing the Nazi past honestly—and insist that most of what the Syrians have heard from their own government over many decades about Israel, the United States, West Germany, Zionism, and the Jews is false.

Yet perhaps the Syrians and the Germans will take the easy path, one of silence and the avoidance of difficult truths. . . . If so, Syrian migration to Germany could weaken the country’s traditions of coming to terms with its Nazi past, foster a growth of anti-Semitism in Germany and Europe, and stimulate a Jewish exodus out of the country.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.