According to a 2014 survey by the Anti-Defamation League, 60 percent of Malaysians hold anti-Semitic beliefs—the highest proportion of any country in Asia outside the Middle East. Hatred of Jews also figures prominently in Malaysian political discourse, rearing its head most recently in the context of the corruption scandal now rocking the country. Jon Emont connects these sentiments to the country’s own social and ethnic divisions:

Anti-Jewish prejudice in Malaysia did not develop in response to the tiny population of Jews who lived here, but instead was tuned to the frequencies of a Muslim world that saw the rise of Israel—and the subjugation of the Palestinians—as the religion’s great humiliation. . . . [Now commonplace in Malaysia is the] idea . . . that Jews are using rival political parties as proxies to dismantle the Muslim Malaysian state. . . .

There are strong similarities between the prejudice that Jews faced in Europe and the one faced by ethnic Chinese throughout Southeast Asia. In both cases, heightened senses of nationalism in host countries in the 20th century led to systematic persecution of the “entrepreneurial minority” based on accusations that the minority was abusing its host country’s generosity and exploiting locals for its community’s own benefits. . . .

[Furthermore, the Muslim, ethnically Malay] ruling party, [now using anti-Semitic allegations to defend its prime minister from charges of corruption], is facing a challenge from an Islamist party that promotes the use of Islamic law. Despite their major philosophical differences, this party and the ethnic-Chinese Democratic Action Party (DAP) have formed an alliance to challenge the ruling United Malay National Organization, so linking DAP with Jewish money could be an attempt to undermine this alliance . . . [in] an attempt to “out-Muslim” rival political parties.

Noah Rothman provides a worthwhile reminder of why a nuclear Iran is a threat not just to Israel, but to the United States:

For one, Iran is the foremost state sponsor of terrorism on earth. It exports terrorists and arms throughout the region and beyond, and there are no guarantees that it won’t play a similarly reckless game with nuclear material. At minimum, the terrorist elements in Iran’s orbit would be emboldened by Iran’s new nuclear might. Their numbers would surely grow, as would their willingness to court risk.

Iran maintains the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the region. It can certainly deliver a warhead to targets inside the Middle East, and it’s fast-tracking the development of space-launch vehicles that can threaten the U.S. mainland. Even if Tehran were a rational actor that could be reliably deterred, an acknowledged Iranian bomb would kick-start a race toward nuclear proliferation in the region. The Saudis, the Turks, the Egyptians, and others would probably be compelled to seek their own nuclear deterrents, leading to an infinitely more complex security environment.

In the meantime, Iran would be able to blackmail the West, allowing it occasionally to choke off the trade and energy exports that transit the Persian Gulf and to engage in far more reckless acts of international terrorism.

As for the possible consequences, Rothman observes:

Iranian retaliation might be measured with the understanding that if it’s not properly calibrated, the U.S. and Israel could begin taking out Iranian command-and-control targets next. If the symbols of the regime begin crumbling, the oppressed Iranian people might find the courage to finish the job. If there’s anything the mullahs fear more than the U.S. military, it’s their own citizens.