If the goal of Vladimir Putin’s intervention in Syria was to preserve the rule of Bashar al-Assad, writes Ari Heistein, then the results are mixed: Assad is still in power, but he has won back relatively little territory and he remains vulnerable. But Putin did succeed in achieving aims of a different sort:

First, Putin’s intervention on behalf of Assad further undermined U.S. credibility as an ally. The autocrats of the region watched President Obama demand that Egypt’s President Mubarak step down in 2011, and then stand idly by as his successor Mohamed Morsi was overthrown. . . . Meanwhile, Russia demonstrated dedication to its only ally in the Arab world by continuing to support the Assad regime throughout the Syrian civil war and ultimately intervening on its behalf. This certainly increases Moscow’s appeal as a potential partner for autocratic Middle Eastern regimes in the future. . . .

Second, Russia exploited tension between critical partners in the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition and turned them against each other. . . . Third, Russian participation in the Syrian civil war defied the Western notion that foreign policy should be guided, at least in part, by moral principles. As Putin often criticized the U.S. for the chaos it caused in Iraq and Libya due to its desire to replace dictatorships with democracies, he demonstrated the benefits of unabashed opportunism and maintaining the autocratic order. . . . Putin paid no political price for ruthlessly bombing hospitals in support of the autocratic Syrian regime.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.