In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs committee, Tony Badran documents the terrorist militia’s large arsenal of rockets and missiles, its increasing influence in Lebanon and Syria, and the danger it poses:

The partnership between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Hizballah has grown to such an extent that it is now meaningful to speak of the LAF as an auxiliary force in Hizballah’s war effort. . . . In certain instances, LAF troops and Hizballah forces have deployed troops jointly, such as during street battles with the followers of a minor Sunni cleric in Sidon in 2013. The LAF routinely raids Syrian refugee camps and Sunni cities in Lebanon, rounding up Sunni men and often detaining them without charges. . . .

The Israelis have no choice but to expect that if war should break out between them and Hizballah, the LAF will come to the direct aid of the latter. . . . In contrast to the policies of Israel and Saudi Arabia, the U.S. is not making its aid to the LAF contingent on its severing its operational ties with Hizballah—a policy which many in the Middle East see as facilitating the partnership between the two.

Iran and Hizballah clearly intend to leverage their success in Syria to change the balance of power with Israel. Specifically, they have set their sights on expanding into the Golan Heights, and on linking it to the south Lebanon front. . . .

As a result, the IDF is preparing for offensive incursions by Hizballah into northern Israel in the next conflict. For Israel, Hizballah’s use of Lebanon as an Iranian forward missile base, its expansion into Syria with an aim to link the Golan to Lebanon, and the prospect of this reality soon getting an Iranian nuclear umbrella, creates an unacceptable situation which, under the right circumstances, could easily trigger a major conflict.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.