Earlier this week, the conservative writer David Horowitz denounced other conservatives who would support a third-party candidate over the presumptive Republican nominee. Horowitz focused his attack on William Kristol, whom the headline to his piece termed a “Republican spoiler and renegade Jew.” While condemning Kristol for allegedly betraying the Jewish people, Horowitz makes a point of clarifying that he himself “has never been to Israel and has never been a Zionist,” and is “an American first.” Jonathan Tobin comments:

[Horowitz’s] attempt to wrap himself in the star of David and to brand his opponents as traitors to the pro-Israel cause . . . should trouble everyone, including those who believe Trump is the lesser of two evils in 2016. . . .

[I]t is possible to argue, . . . as some ardent members of the pro-Israel community have done, that Trump is the better choice from the point of view of strengthening the U.S.-Israel alliance. But it is not possible to conclude that someone who believes Trump can’t be counted on or viewed as much of an improvement over [Hillary] Clinton is a traitor to Israel. It is certainly not possible to say that to Kristol, who has devoted so much effort to support of Israel throughout his career and especially as a leader of the opposition to Barack Obama’s policies. . . .

Neither Horowitz nor Breitbart.com [the website where the article appeared] has the right to assume the pose of a Jewish pope with the ability to excommunicate all those who cannot stomach Trump as heretics.

Examining the effects of Iran’s decision to launch nearly 200 ballistic missiles at Israel on October 1, Benny Morris takes stock of the Jewish state’s strategic situation:

The massive Iranian attack has turned what began as a local war in and around the Gaza Strip and then expanded into a Hamas–Hizballah–Houthi–Israeli war [into] a regional war with wide and possibly calamitous international repercussions.

Before the Iranians launched their attack, Washington warned Tehran to desist (“don’t,” in President Biden’s phrase), and Israel itself had reportedly cautioned the Iranians secretly that such an attack would trigger a devastating Israeli counterstrike. But a much-humiliated Iran went ahead, nonetheless.

For Israel, the way forward seems to lie in an expansion of the war—in the north or south or both—until the country attains some sort of victory, or a diplomatic settlement is reached. A “victory” would mean forcing Hizballah to cease fire in exchange, say, for a cessation of the IDF bombing campaign and withdrawal to the international border, or forcing Iran, after suffering real pain from IDF attacks, to cease its attacks and rein in its proxies: Hizballah, Hamas, and the Houthis.

At the same time, writes Morris, a victory along such lines would still have its limits:

An IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon and a cessation of Israeli air-force bombing would result in Hizballah’s resurgence and its re-investment of southern Lebanon down to the border. Neither the Americans nor the French nor the UN nor the Lebanese army—many of whose troops are Shiites who support Hizballah—would fight them.