The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) establishes what it calls a “procurement channel”: a series of procedures and regulations for monitoring and restricting Iran’s purchase of goods that could be used for the illicit development of nuclear technology. In theory, write David Albright and Andrea Stricker, these procedures allow the U.S. and other concerned parties to stop suspicious purchases before they are completed. In practice, however, the procedures are riddled with complexities and obstructions. What’s more, Albright and Stricker argue, Russia and China have already begun to exploit the deal’s weaknesses:

Given the short time frames to act to block a [proposed purchase], efficiency and speed in the process are critical. According to P5+1 officials, Russia attempted to exploit the lack of clarity about procurement-channel rules and functions to weaken [the JCPOA’s] effectiveness, and has been supported by China in some of those endeavors. One official accused Russia of attempting to manipulate the whole process. Russia’s action may also polarize decision making at the Procurement Working Group (PWG) [the international committee tasked with implementing the procurement-channel regulations] by creating de-facto voting blocs, with Russia, China, and Iran on one side and the United States, Britain, France, and Germany on the other. Russia’s role overall appears to be to complicate the rejection of [procurement requests] within the tight guidelines imposed by the JCPOA and isolate certain sensitive exports from the procurement-channel process. . . .

[Furthermore], Iran has tried to argue, with Russian support, that anything military-related is not the business of the PWG. This argument in essence states that the PWG does not have jurisdiction over any imports by Iran’s military or missile industries, all of which need a considerable amount of dual-use equipment. Iran appears to be arguing that it will seek to buy banned equipment under a civilian cover, and if caught by the PWG, the PWG can only send the issue to the UN Security Council for a decision. It cannot stop the sale on its own authority.

Of course, the United States would be expected to block any approval for a sale at the Security Council. So, in that sense, the Iranian effort will not be successful. But Iran, with Russian support, may be seeking to reduce the PWG’s credibility internationally and hinder its operations.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.