While a popular adage states that bullets can’t kill ideas, they can prove quite effective, argues Dennis Ross, when it comes to the ideas of Islamic State (IS)—especially if coupled with savvy use of social media and a change in policy toward Iran:

Islamic State claims to have a divine mandate. Suffering military defeats can demonstrate the hollowness of this claim. Presently, [the U.S. is] rolling it back in both Iraq and Syria. Unfortunately, until [America and its allies] undo the group’s greatest symbolic victories—its seizure of Mosul in Iraq and the establishment of a capital in Raqqa, Syria—its image of success will remain. [Taking away] the symbols of these achievements is thus essential and would be impossible [for IS] to hide.

There are other means for exposing the fraudulent nature of the group’s claims, and here social media can play a role. . . Why not showcase those surrendering on social media? What kind of divine messengers surrender? Similarly, put defectors on social-media platforms and let them tell the story of the brutality, injustice, exploitation of women, and corrupt and arbitrary nature of rule in IS-controlled territory.

IS [also] claims it is the protector of Sunni Muslims against the non-believers and . . . Shiite Muslims. If nothing else, this tells us that Iran cannot be a partner in discrediting IS. On the contrary, its role in the mass killing of Sunnis in Syria has contributed to the rise of IS. We need the Sunnis—clerics, tribes, and governments—to discredit and replace IS on the ground. . . . Our problem in getting Sunnis to take on this role is that our priority in Syria and Iraq is IS—while Iran, the Shiite militias, and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad are the Sunni preoccupations. . . . The next president must understand this complicated reality and use our readiness to counter Iran in the region to gain leverage and influence to move the Sunnis to make IS their priority as well as ours.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.