Since revolts, demonstrations, and civil war gripped the Arab world in 2011, Jordan has remained one of the few oases of stability. But now, writes Evgeni Klauber, there are signs that the kingdom is more fragile than it seems:

Jordan is suffering from a profound economic crisis, and is affected by the regional instability deriving primarily from the Syrian civil war. Unemployment and the economic crisis have led to waves of social protest, combined with demands for democratization and regime change. Unemployment, a weak civil society, Islamist infiltration, and other challenges the kingdom faces have brought the masses onto the streets demanding change. Until now, public criticism of the Jordanian government never threatened to cross the line into open civil revolt as in Egypt and Syria, but no one knows what tomorrow might bring. . . .

Jihadist Islam has [also] reared its head in Jordan recently: just a few days ago, Islamic State (IS) accepted responsibility for a terrorist attack that took place there two weeks ago, in which six Jordanian soldiers were killed by a car bomb in a refugee camp close to the Syrian border. [Thereafter], it was reported for the first time that the Jordanian army attacked IS targets in the Syrian Golan from the kingdom’s territory. . . .

Although it has absorbed hundreds of thousands of refugees from Syria, Jordan is one of the last countries left to have remained relatively stable since 2011. Its security forces now estimate that there are IS “sleeper cells” in the refugee camps, and that these are starting to wake up. [Some] commentators believe that the Syrian war is about to spread to Jordan.

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Jordan: The Arab Spring Knocks Once More

This piece was first published on the Hebrew-language website Mida on July 6, 2016, rendered into English by Avi Woolf, and republished here with permission.

Two weeks ago, on June 22nd, violent clashes broke out between police and protesters in the Jordanian city of Dhiban, one of the poorest towns in the country, after thousands of young people hit the streets demanding an end to rising unemployment and an improvement for their economic condition. Some members of the security forces were injured during the riots, and dozens of protesters were arrested.

As we know, similar events broke out in Tunisia, symbolizing the beginning of what was called the “Arab Spring” in the Middle East. Dhiban also saw a social protest in 2011, and the fact that the protest has returned there is a signal to the Arab states that the “Arab Spring” still echoes in the background. The youth demonstrations began two months ago, and towards June they escalated and were accompanied by acts of violence. Dhiban has 39,000 residents; according to Al-Jazeera, most of the youth there are supported by welfare offices or receive meager unemployment from the state which is insufficient to allow them to live respectably.

Jordan is suffering from a profound economic crisis, and is affected by the regional instability deriving primarily from the Syrian civil war. Unemployment and the economic crisis have led to waves of social protest, combined with demands for democratization and regime change. Unemployment, a weak civil society, Islamist infiltration, and other challenges the kingdom faces have brought the masses onto the streets demanding change. Until now, public criticism of the Jordanian government never threatened to cross the line into open civil revolt as in Egypt and Syria, but no one knows what tomorrow might bring.

According to the World Bank, unemployment in Jordan reached almost 29 percent in 2014-2015. We should note that Jordan has seen worse times in terms of unemployment: in 2006-2010, unemployment reached 33 percent. But then, before the “Arab Spring,” the protestors did not hit the streets. Today, that’s exactly what they’re doing.

The economic crisis in the country has been going on for a decade, and the government deficit has reached a peak this year. The new agreement between the government of Jordan and the International Monetary Fund required the government to reduce welfare transfer payments and raise taxes, an unpopular act which led to criticism from different groups in the country.

Jordan has failed to end the crisis and has experienced a drop in growth (just 2.4 percent in 2015)—this despite the many efforts of King Abdullah, which included the dismissal of the previous prime minister, the dispersal of parliament, going to general elections for parliament, and handing over the authority to form a government to Hani al-Mulki.

Abdullah has tried at the same time to deal with other crises, such as the water crisis. Water is a rare commodity in a country whose territory is 92-percent desert. Just last June, the Jordanian government announced the intention of seventeen international companies to submit proposals to build the Red Sea-Dead Sea canal, which as its name suggests will connect the Red Sea to the Dead Sea and provide jobs. Commentators see the present economic crisis as the main cause of the youth protests, alongside the government’s lack of success in fighting extremists infiltrating from Syria.

Islam Rises

Jordanians have enjoyed relative stability over the last few decades. This stability was achieved largely thanks to the governmental structure of a parliamentary monarchy, which allowed the exclusion of opposition parties, repression of opposition from civil society, and the blocking of legislation that could harm the royal house. It seems that King Abdullah, who in the beginning showed signs of pushing rapid modernization, now supports gradual, slow reforms and is not quick to open up the government to oppositional forces.

Jordan, which since its independence has developed close ties with the West, enjoys generous American aid packages. Its relative stability allows it to get substantial economic help. We should remember that Jordan is participating in the American-led coalition against Islamic State (IS), and that IS fighters took a Jordanian pilot hostage and executed him.

As Eyal Zisser wrote recently, the continuing stability of the kingdom and the longevity of the Hashemite dynasty at its head are due to a few factors. The first reason has to do with Jordan’s strategic position as a “buffer state,” separating between Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. All of Jordan’s neighbors have had an interest in preserving Jordan as a buffer state and an island of immunity, granting the latter a significant advantage. The second reason has to do with the monarchical institution in Jordan, “which draws on local and Arab tradition and is not contrary thereto,” as opposed to the institution of the presidency in the socialist republics of Syria and (formerly) Iraq. The third reason Zisser notes is “the restraint and moderation which always characterized the kingdom and those who stood at its head.”

The Jordanian opposition is made up of two groups: secularists and Islamists. The secular opposition is made up of pan-Arab nationalist groups and socialist groups. The strength of these groups grew in the 1950s, to the point that King Hussein appointed the socialist Sulayman al-Nabulsi as Prime Minister in 1956. Al-Nabulsi gained a great deal of popularity and at one stage even  started to threaten King Hussein—thus leading to the former’s dismissal and a significant reduction of the powers of the state’s representative institutions.

In 1989, during the attempt to conduct free and democratic elections to the Jordanian parliament, the secular opposition roared back to life. The communist party and the nationalist center party won seats in the parliament. Today, there is no trace of these opposition forces in the Jordanian parliament, and their absence from the Jordanian scene is what has led to feelings of anger and disappointment among the youth who took to the streets in Dhiban. The deep frustration in civil society is a result of a continuing policy of exclusion of any sign of opposition in the kingdom.

Alongside the secular movements are the Islamists. In March and April 2016, Jordanian authorities closed down the headquarters of the Muslim Brothers in Amman and in Jerash in the north of the country, Madaba in the west, and so on. According to media reports, “the Muslim Brotherhood organization in its old form did not receive a permit to operate in accordance with the Parties and Associations Law approved in 2014, after it did not toe the line with the authorities’ demands.”

However, the Jordanian government is patient and tolerant toward the Islamic Action Front, the moderate political vestige of the Muslim Brotherhood which is headed by Mohammad Zyoud. In the past, Zyoud served in a key position in the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, and after he moderated he succeeded in compromising with the royal house. As opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Action Front is an organization which may operate under Jordanian law. Moreover, a month ago the organization declared its intention to run in the parliamentary elections.

Jihadist Islam has reared its head in Jordan recently: just a few days ago, IS accepted responsibility for a terrorist attack which took place there two weeks ago, in which six Jordanian soldiers were killed by a car bomb in a refugee camp close to the Syrian border. Thereafter, it was reported for the first time that the Jordanian army attacked IS targets in the Syrian Golan from the kingdom’s territory. A Jordanian senior official said in the wake of the attack that “the rules of the game on the border between Jordan and Syria have changed. From now on, Jordan will be more sensitive to any military or civilian movement close to its border and will act against it with force.”

Although it has absorbed hundreds of thousands of refugees from Syria, Jordan is one of the last countries left to remain relatively stable since 2011. The state’s security forces estimate that there are IS “sleeper cells” in the refugee camps, and that these are starting to wake up. Foreign commentators believe that the Syrian war is about to spread to Jordan.

The increasing number of refugees from Jordan and Iraq, including those not on the government lists, is estimated at 1.5 million. As Zisser writes, “these refugees place a heavy burden on the economic infrastructure of the country, but at the same time remind every Jordanian what a war of civilians and brothers can lead to and the danger inherent in a political protests which can get out of control.” Unsurprisingly, in the wake of the attacks, the Jordanian foreign minister, Nasser Judeh, has called on the international community to cease pressuring Jordan to absorb refugees from Syria.

Moreover, the Jordanian army has declared its border with Syria and Iraq a closed military zone. In the wake of this decision, thousands of Syrian refugees who were in the area have abandoned it after the food supply was cut off. The convoys which provided food for the refugees can no longer reach the territory, now under siege by the Jordanian army, and they are waiting for its removal. In the past, entry into Jordan from the Syrian border was relatively simple. After the infiltration of these extremists began to be a problem for the authorities, border control was tightened, and efforts to stop the flow of Syrian refugees into the Hashemite kingdom have increased.

It seems that Jordan will continue to be affected by the instability in the region. The Syrian civil war has increased the threats to the kingdom and the general feeling of instability, and the youth will continue to take to the streets.

Interested in a Nuclear Reactor

Two years ago, King Abdullah visited Russia and met with President Vladimir Putin. Among the issues on the agenda was the Jordanian desire to work with Moscow to build a nuclear reactor. Jordan, which needs new sources of energy, has already considered the nuclear option, and the designated site is the city of Aqaba. It was recently reported again that the Jordanians are interested in an agreement with the Russians, as part of which Russian companies will build the reactor and even bear the costs of the project. The Jordanians need this project because energy prices are forcing them to tighten their belts. Moreover, the project may create new jobs, including for the youth presently protesting in Dhiban against unemployment.

Make no mistake though: the Jordanians have not abandoned the Americans. The Congressional Research Service reported in January 2016 that Jordan is enabling coalition forces to use its bases, and even shares intelligence with them. The kingdom hosts the American military unit which numbers some 2,000 soldiers and is an important foothold for the anti-terror coalition.

Jordan is an integral part of the Sunni anti-terror coalition. The United States sends the Jordanians weapons deliveries meant for Syrian rebels. The Americans recently wondered after it became known that weapons meant for Syrian rebels were stolen and sold by local intelligence officers, who used the money to buy luxury items. Despite this incident, the Jordanians are a significant strategic partner for the United States in the Middle East, but we should not ignore the fact that the Jordanians also see the Russians as a potential source of power.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.