In 2013, the Egyptian military launched a coup to seize power from an elected government affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and apparently bent on undermining democracy. Something like the same thing occurred in Turkey last week—except that there the coup was unsuccessful. But Egypt’s Islamists were watching closely, writes Eric Trager:

[Egyptian] Islamists believe that Erdogan’s victory can inspire [their country’s] various opposition movements to come together. “Perhaps this will lead revolutionaries inside and outside Egypt to unify around the goal of ending this coup,” Brotherhood leader Gamal Heshmat said in an interview. Other Brotherhood leaders suggested that Erdogan’s success indicates that no coup can last forever. And whenever Egypt’s current [military] regime falters, the Brotherhood intends to follow Erdogan’s example in quickly targeting enemies within the state.

Nor is the Egyptian Brotherhood the only Islamist group that, according to Jonathan Schanzer, has reason to be pleased with Erdogan’s restoration:

Turkey has never been fully committed to countering Islamic State. The Erdogan government has been more eager to topple the Assad regime in Syria. This position is understandable, given the atrocities Assad has committed. But, what is inexcusable is Turkey’s decision to allow its southeastern frontier to be exploited by Islamist fighters seeking to join the fray. Islamic State has undeniably benefited. . . .

For the past few weeks, it seemed that Turkey was ready to buckle down, particularly after the terror attack on Istanbul’s airport. But that was fleeting. Friday night’s coup attempt is now sure to pull Ankara into another protracted battle: the purge of domestic enemies.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.