Politicians, government officials, and the media are often quick to describe the recent murderous attacks in Europe and America as the work of individuals who either commit violence for largely personal reasons or are inspired by reading jihadist propaganda online. In truth, argues Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, most have been recruited by Islamic State (IS) and have received operational assistance:

Jihadists plotting murders in the West used to congregate in person, meeting in small groups in underground mosques, houses, or other discreet locations. Radicalization occurred through in-person contact. Counterterrorism officials looked for physical hubs of recruitment, tapping phones and scanning videos for evidence that cells were meeting.

But with the social-media boom and the growth in encrypted communications, [both] radicalization and operational planning can easily take place entirely online. IS has capitalized on [developing] communications technologies, building cohesive online communities that foster a sense of “remote intimacy” and thus facilitate radicalization. The group has also established a team of “virtual planners” who use the Internet to identify recruits and to coordinate and direct attacks, often without meeting the perpetrators in person. [For instance], Junaid Hussain, a British IS operative who was killed in August 2015, played the role of virtual planner for the May 2015 strike against the “draw Mohammed ” contest in Garland, Texas.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.