On January 17, evidently in exchange for a large and secretive cash payment from Washington, Iran freed three American hostages. But only two days earlier, Shiite militiamen captured three U.S. contractors in Baghdad and subjected them to a month of horrific torture before releasing them. Max Boot, commenting on recently published interviews with the captives, notes that the two incidents were connected:

The Popular Mobilization Forces, the Shiite militia group of which these kidnappers were a part, is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Iranian Quds Force. It is doubtful that the kidnappers could have held three Americans for a month without at least a tacit okay from the Iranian government—and probably would not have released them, either, without an okay from Tehran.

But we know nothing about why the men were held or why they were released. . . . Was a deal struck between Washington and Tehran or between Washington and Baghdad? It did not necessarily have to be a monetary deal—there could have been a quid pro quo of some kind. We simply don’t know. If Congress is going to probe the $400-million payment to Tehran, it should probe the contractors’ kidnapping as well, along with the more recent seizure of further dual-national Iranians to replace the ones that have been released.

Tamir Hayman analyzes the latest reports about an offer by Hamas to release three female soldiers in exchange for 150 captured terrorists, of whom 90 have received life sentences; then, if that exchange happens successfully, a second stage of the deal will begin.

If this does happen, Israel will release all the serious prisoners who had been sentenced to life and who are associated with Hamas, which will leave Israel without any bargaining chips for the second stage. In practice, Israel will release everyone who is important to Hamas without getting back all the hostages. In this situation, it’s evident that Israel will approach the second stage of the negotiations in the most unfavorable way possible. Hamas will achieve all its demands in the first stage, except for a commitment from Israel to end the war completely.

How does this relate to the fighting in Rafah? Hayman explains:

In the absence of an agreement or compromise by Hamas, it is detrimental for Israel to continue the static situation we were in. It is positive that new energy has entered the campaign. . . . The [capture of the] border of the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing are extremely important achievements, while the ongoing dismantling of the battalions is of secondary importance.

That being said, Hayman is critical of the approach to negotiations taken so far:

Gradual hostage trades don’t work. We must adopt a different concept of a single deal in which Israel offers a complete cessation of the war in exchange for all the hostages.