As Russian and Syrian jets pummel Aleppo, making a deliberate effort to target civilians, John Kerry insists that yet more negotiations with Moscow can somehow bring an end to the fighting, American generals have told Congress that they are reluctant to go along with Kerry’s plan to share intelligence with Russia, and the president remains silent. Frederic Hof writes:

With defenseless civilians in the bullseye, there is no prospect for diplomatic progress in Syria; and the Assad regime and Russia make Islamic State look hesitant by comparison when it comes to mass homicide. . . .

The American ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, won the Pulitzer Prize for a . . . volume about 20th-century mass murder and how American presidents either measured up to the challenge or skulked away. For it is only presidential leadership that can convert mass indifference to pointed resolve. It is the lack of such leadership in this administration that gives birth to diplomatic long shots that benefit neither from useful leverage nor from a unified executive-branch position. The administration even went out of its way to sink preemptively a piece of sanctions legislation aimed at mitigating civilian slaughter in Syria, one that certainly would have gotten the attention of Kerry’s Russian counterpart. . . .

A careful consideration of military options is not pleasant work for any American president. Yet in this case it must be done. Yes, the Russian presence in Syria—about to mark its first anniversary—complicates things. No, no one is calling for invasion, occupation, or violent regime change. Unless, however, the Assad regime’s free ride for mass murder is brought to a screeching halt—and soon—there may be hell to pay, and not just by Syrians.

The Vladimir Putins of the world may not always draw the correct conclusions from their perceptions of weakness, but they inevitably draw conclusions that can create danger—and not just in Syria. President Obama should . . . demand of his defense secretary options for exacting a price from a murderous, cowardly regime currently convinced it can do with absolute impunity as it pleases to children and their parents, where and when it wants.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.