Although Hizballah’s military and terrorist operations are planned and conducted entirely by men, the organization relies on the support of a large number of Lebanese women who depend on the social services it provides, often get jobs working for its civilian institutions, are supported by the paychecks of their husbands or sons who are Hizballah fighters, and can expect a lifetime stipend if these fighters are “martyred.” But as the fighting in Syria takes its toll, social services and compensation for the families of “martyrs” have been cut, and young widows are being pressured by the organization into a form of legal prostitution in which they are “assigned” to terrorists on leave. Increasingly, writes Hanin Ghaddar, these developments have led to friction:

Hizballah’s institutions constitute an alternative economic structure that hires and attracts [both] men and women. A girl in Hizballah’s community is brought up in the organization’s schools. She is expected to work in Hizballah institutions, marry a Hizballah fighter, and promote Hizballah’s values both outside and inside her family. The “Party of God” knows that a disciplined and committed woman can raise disciplined and committed fighters. It is a system that physically reproduces itself.

But the endless war in Syria is producing cracks in the system, and women are no longer as engaged as they used to be—or being compensated for their sacrifices the way that men are. . . . [T]he wives of the new recruits . . . are not necessarily Hizballah members and are generally not committed to the ideology or the war, but they are part of the community that the party allegedly is protecting. They are mostly from poor families. [If widowed], these women tend to suffer [the most] financially. . . .

Women are Hizballah’s main internal problem. The war in Syria means they are losing sons, brothers, and husbands. It is marginalizing their role in the party, and pushing the poorest among them to the edge of survival. . . . The communal frustration and inequities that the war continues to exacerbate and deepen may soon lead to an explosion.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.