Emboldened by the chaos in Iraq and Syria, and the withdrawal of U.S. regional influence, the Islamic Republic aspires to push westward, uninterrupted, to the Mediterranean Sea through a network of clients and allies. This plan, writes Martin Chulov, has become increasingly evident as it nears realization:

The corridor starts at the entry points that Iran has used to send supplies and manpower into Iraq over the past twelve years. They are the same routes that were used by the Quds force [of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps] to run a guerrilla war against U.S. forces when they occupied the country—a campaign fought by the same Iraqi militias that have since been immersed in the fight against Islamic State (IS). . . .

The militias are now, . . . in large numbers, . . . readying to move toward the western edge of Mosul, to a point around 50 miles southeast of Sinjar, which—at this point—is the next leg in the corridor. . . .

Of all the points between Tehran and the Syrian coast, Aleppo has concentrated Iran’s energies more than anywhere else. Up to 6,000 militia members, mostly from Iraq, have congregated there ahead of a move to take the rebel-held east of the city, which could begin around the same time as the assault on Mosul. . . .

“If we lose Syria, we lose Tehran,” [the Quds-force commander, Qassem] Suleimani told the late Iraqi politician Ahmed Chalabi in 2014. “We will turn all this chaos into an opportunity.”

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.