On Sunday, Hizballah held a military parade in the Syrian city of Qusayr, located about ten miles from the Lebanese border; among the armaments on display were American-made armored personnel carriers (APCs). It’s quite possible that these were given to the terrorist organization by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), as Beirut is the fifth-largest recipient of American military aid. While the APCs could also have been plundered from the now-defunct South Lebanese Army, the fact remains that the LAF has become an ally of Hizballah, as Lee Smith writes:

The 2016 U.S. appropriations bill to Lebanon stipulated that military aid must be used “to professionalize the LAF and to strengthen border security and combat terrorism, including training and equipping the LAF to secure Lebanon’s borders, interdicting arms shipments, [and] preventing the use of Lebanon as a safe haven for terrorist groups.” The military assistance was also intended to help Lebanon “implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701,” [by] disarming Hizballah and helping the government of Lebanon take full control of all its territory.

The parade in Qusayr shows that the opposite is the case. U.S. funding has done nothing to enhance the LAF’s ability to assert the sovereignty of the Beirut government, and instead has enhanced Hizballah’s ability to wage war in Syria. Indeed, the point of the parade was to show that Hizballah runs parts of Syrian terrain as well—with the help of the LAF.

[Even if] the LAF didn’t transfer the [APCs], . . . the LAF is still responsible because it did nothing to stop the party of God [Hizballah] as it took the equipment to the Syrian border and then across it. The Security Council resolutions were intended to ensure Lebanese sovereignty and sever Hizballah’s pipeline to Syria. Instead, the LAF, with the support of the White House, has helped Hizballah violate Lebanon’s sovereignty, as well as Syria’s, for that matter. The Lebanese Armed Forces are incapable of fulfilling any part of the requirements laid out in the appropriations bill. And that’s not simply because it’s an incompetent force, but rather because it’s under Hizballah’s control. . . .

[I]n continuing to support the Lebanese army, the Obama White House is actively supporting the pro-Iran axis in the Syrian conflict. And this is part of a larger regional pattern, evident in Iraq as well, where Iranian-backed Shiite militias are also using American-made military equipment. . . . Congress should move immediately to defund the Lebanese Armed Forces.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.