In an open letter to the president-elect, Michael Totten puts forth some guidelines for dealing with a chaotic world and a Middle East in crisis: “Get real about Russia, finish off Islamic State in Syria, back the Kurds to the hilt, downgrade relations with Turkey, repair our relations with Israel, and crack down hard on Iran.” More specifically, he writes:

Only in an upside-down world does it make any kind of sense to pal around with Recep Tayyip Erdogan and slam Benjamin Netanyahu, as Barack Obama has done. . . .

You can spend four or eight years trying to force the Israelis to give up more than they already have, but it won’t do an iota of good if the Palestinian side remains rejectionist. It won’t earn you many points with the Arab world, either, and the only way you’ll earn points with the likes of Hamas is by ordering airstrikes on Tel Aviv.

There can be no peace between Israelis and Palestinians while Hamas still rules Gaza, and one of the reasons Hamas still rules Gaza is because it’s still receiving money and guns from Iran, just as the Assad regime and Hizballah do.

The Iranian government’s ultimate goal is to become the regional hegemon of the greater Middle East. That emerging reality didn’t disturb President Obama, but it should keep you up at night. . . . You should start twisting the screws again posthaste, and you should make it clear before you’re inaugurated that you’re going to do so. The sooner you adopt these measures, the sooner the Iranians will realize that you are not like your predecessor and shouldn’t be messed with. . . .

All this advice is based on one simple principle—you reward your friends and punish your enemies. It’s the first rule of foreign policy, one that has been with us since antiquity and will survive until the end of time.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.