Founded just after the 1979 revolution, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) fields elite military and paramilitary units (now deployed throughout Iraq and Syria), engages in clandestine activities and support for terror abroad, and is responsible for the country’s nuclear and ballistic-missile programs. It also exerts sizable political influence and controls a significant portion of the Islamic Republic’s economy. In a comprehensive study, Emanuele Ottolenghi, Saeed Ghasseminejad, Annie Fixler, and Amir Toumaj explain the various avenues through which the nuclear agreement grants the IRGC new sources of funding, and what can be done to restrict these without violating the deal’s terms:

Neither the U.S. nor the EU has sanctioned the vast majority of IRGC-linked companies. We have identified at least 229 companies with significant IRGC influence, either through equity shares or positions on the board of directors. The U.S. Treasury, however, has only sanctioned 25 IRGC individuals, 25 companies, and two academic institutions as owned or controlled by the IRGC. . . .

[As the nuclear deal is implemented and] export and trade restrictions are lifted, previously prohibited Western technology will make its way back to Iran. The challenge of denying the IRGC access to banned technology—including dual-use technology and equipment for monitoring dissidents—will become even more arduous. The demise of sanctions may also facilitate the acquisition of advanced weaponry that will improve Tehran’s conventional military capabilities, including the capabilities of the IRGC, which in turn may trickle down and enhance its ability to support the Syrian regime, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Hizballah in Lebanon, and Houthi rebels in Yemen, to name a few.

[Furthermore], the United States and European Union have lifted specific sanctions against strategic sectors of the Iranian economy. We judge that [these] sectors are important for two reasons: the IRGC has an overwhelming stake in these sectors, and the sectors combined account for nearly half of Iran’s total GDP. Additionally, . . . these sectors are important to Iran’s ballistic-missile development.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.