Citing the adage that you don’t get a second chance to make a first impression, John Hannah argues that the next president will have at most six months to show the rest of the world what sort of leader he or she will be. Making the correct impression will be especially important given the current disarray of American foreign policy. To this end, Hannah offers some recommendations:

Maintain a long-term troop presence in Iraq even after Islamic State’s caliphate is destroyed. . . . Communicate immediately to Iran through private channels that further threats to U.S. naval vessels in the Persian Gulf will no longer be tolerated. The next time Iranian gunboats swarm one of our ships, they will face lethal force. And should Iran fail to heed that warning, follow through decisively and be prepared to escalate accordingly—and disproportionately.

Additionally, make sure the Israeli prime minister is among the first foreign leaders received at the White House and leave no doubt that the days of public backbiting and “distancing” from America’s most important and capable Middle Eastern ally are over. While relying on the State Department and other relevant agencies to maintain active diplomacy with China, Russia, and even Iran, focus the bulk of the president’s personal diplomatic energies during the first year on consolidating relations with allied nations—in NATO, the Middle East, and Asia, including trips to each region, if possible.

The message should be unmistakable: maintaining the strength and vitality of America’s alliances is at the center of our global strategy, not propitiating those who mean us harm. The distinction between the two sets of actors should be clear—and certainly not turned on its head as has too often been the perception under President Obama.

Another point of differentiation from the Obama team: try to do as much of this as possible without trashing the previous administration, especially overseas. Let the actions speak for themselves. Also: no more apologizing for past U.S. failures or alleged transgressions.

Robert Clark explains why the resumption of hostilities is both just and necessary:

These latest Israeli strikes come after weeks of consistent Palestinian provocation; they have repeatedly broken the terms of the cease-fire which they claimed they were so desperate for. There have been numerous [unsuccessful] bus bombings near Tel Aviv and Palestinian-instigated clashes in the West Bank. Fifty-nine Israeli hostages are still held in captivity.

In fact, Hamas and their Palestinian supporters . . . have always known that they can sit back, parade dead Israeli hostages live on social media, and receive hundreds of their own convicted terrorists and murderers back in return. They believed they could get away with the October 7 pogrom.

One hopes Hamas’s leaders will get the message. Meanwhile, many inside and outside Israel seem to believe that, by resuming the fighting, Jerusalem has given up on rescuing the remaining hostages. But, writes Ron Ben-Yishai, this assertion misunderstands the goals of the present campaign. “Experience within the IDF and Israeli intelligence,” Ben-Yishai writes, “has shown that such pressure is the most effective way to push Hamas toward flexibility.” He outlines two other aims:

The second objective was to signal to Hamas that Israel is not only targeting its military wing—the terror army that was the focus of previous phases of the war up until the last cease-fire—but also its governance structure. This was demonstrated by the targeted elimination of five senior officials from Hamas’s political and civilian administration. . . . The strikes also served as a message to mediators, particularly Egypt, that Israel opposes Hamas remaining in any governing or military capacity in post-war Gaza.

The third objective was to create intense military pressure, coordinated with the U.S., on all remaining elements of the Shiite “axis of resistance,” including Yemen’s Houthis, Hamas, and Iran.