The recent executive order suspending the U.S. refugee-admission program allows exceptions for members of religious minorities facing persecution in their home countries. It also instructs the Departments of State and Homeland Security, when the program resumes, “to prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual’s country of nationality.” Although he finds the overall order flawed “on policy and moral grounds,” Samuel Tadros argues that it was correct in this regard:

[W]hile all communities in the path of Islamic State may be forced to flee, the refuge opportunities available differ significantly based on one’s ethnic and religious background. A Sunni fleeing Bashar al-Assad’s butchery may find a home in a neighboring Sunni country, or in other Sunni territory in Syria, but where can a Yazidi go? Surely not to Baghdad, where he would be persecuted. Is Turkey, which persecutes its own Christian population, supposed to be the choice destiny for Syria or Iraq’s Christians? Do we expect Assyrian Christians to be comfortable going to Kurdish areas? Moreover, even when/if Islamic State is defeated, the likelihood of return diminishes for these religious minorities. Does one seriously expect Christians to be able to return to Mosul, where their homes have likely been occupied by others, and where many of their neighbors stood silently watching as Islamic State targeted them? The Jewish experience in Poland following the Holocaust is a reminder of what awaits these communities.

Some may point to Jordan as a welcoming place for these minorities, and even more so to Lebanon. But in Jordan, which should be lauded for its welcoming of Syrian refugees, as in any other Arabic speaking country, they will be permanent refugees, forever housed in the camps with no future. A quick visit to a Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon would enlighten anyone to what that life entails, as Arabic-speaking countries insisted on keeping Palestinians there to use as a bargaining chip with Israel. . . .

Will a prioritization policy, however, make matters worse for these communities, [as some have argued]? Will they be accused of being a fifth column? As an Arabic proverb says “it does not hurt a sheep to be skinned after being slaughtered.” The fate of a Yazidi girl running from Islamic State will not be made worse if she is perceived to be a prioritized refugee. Religious minorities in the Levant are being annihilated by Islamic State. Nothing worse can befall them.

Regardless of one’s views on how many refugees the United States should accept, the reality is that it will not accept all those who seek to come. A prioritization process is natural and hardly novel, and while one that bans people based on their religion is morally repugnant, one that prioritizes the more vulnerable, even on the basis of [religion], is not.

While I’ve seen much speculation—some reasonable and well informed, some quite the opposite—about why Jerusalem chose Friday morning to begin its campaign against Iran, the most obvious explanation seems to be the most convincing. First, 60 days had passed since President Trump warned that Tehran had 60 days to reach an agreement with the U.S. over its nuclear program. Second, Israeli intelligence was convinced that Iran was too close to developing nuclear weapons to delay military action any longer. Edward Luttwak explains why Israel was wise to attack:

Iran was adding more and more centrifuges in increasingly vast facilities at enormous expense, which made no sense at all if the aim was to generate energy. . . . It might be hoped that Israel’s own nuclear weapons could deter an Iranian nuclear attack against its own territory. But a nuclear Iran would dominate the entire Middle East, including Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, with which Israel has full diplomatic relations, as well as Saudi Arabia with which Israel hopes to have full relations in the near future.

Luttwak also considers the military feats the IDF and Mossad have accomplished in the past few days:

To reach all [its] targets, Israel had to deal with the range-payload problem that its air force first overcame in 1967, when it destroyed the air forces of three Arab states in a single day. . . . This time, too, impossible solutions were found for the range problem, including the use of 65-year-old airliners converted into tankers (Boeing is years later in delivering its own). To be able to use its short-range F-16s, Israel developed the “Rampage” air-launched missile, which flies upward on a ballistic trajectory, gaining range by gliding down to the target. That should make accuracy impossible—but once again, Israeli developers overcame the odds.