Up until 2013, the Islamic Republic was developing ballistic missiles with a range of up to 5,000 kilometers, which could reach Europe and even be used against the United States. Yet, following the negotiations concluded in Geneva in November 2013—the interim agreement that led to the 2015 nuclear deal—Iranian officials ceased boasting about developing missiles with a range exceeding 2,000 kilometers. Such missiles, like the one tested last week, could hit any part of Israel, but could not target Europe. Examining the statements made in Iranian media, A. Savyon, Yigal Carmon, and U. Kafash see evidence that Tehran made an unreported pledge to the U.S. not to develop any missiles that can reach farther than 2,000 kilometers:

[A]lthough the permission given to Iran to develop missiles capable of striking Israel is likely not a secret annex of the JCPOA, it still constitutes [an] unwritten understanding that is an integral part of the nuclear deal. It is convenient for both sides not to publish this understanding in written form—for Iran because it rejects any public reference to its missile program, which it defines as defensive but which is in fact offensive, and for the Obama administration because there would be repercussions if it were to be revealed that it had given Iran permission to develop missiles capable of striking Israel.

It should be noted that UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (passed in 2015) constitutes an additional concession by the Obama administration to Iran, in comparison with the previous resolution 1929 (from 2010). This concession has two components. First, UNSCR 1929 banned Iran from conducting any activity concerning missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, while UNSCR 2231 replaced the word “capable,” which refers to objective specifications, with the phrase “designed to be capable,” which concerns fluid political matters. Second, while UNSCR 1929 banned Iran from conducting any missile activity, UNSCR 2231 rescinds this ban.

Following Iran’s May 9, 2016 missile test, which took place after the JCPOA’s implementation day—and which embarrassed the Obama administration—the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ aerospace and missile division director Amir Ali Hajizadeh said, “The Americans are telling [us]: ‘Don’t talk about missile affairs, and if you conduct a test or maneuver, don’t mention it.’”

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.