On Wednesday, a group of terrorists attacked the Iranian parliament building and the tomb of Ayatollah Khomeini, killing at least twelve; Islamic State (IS) has claimed responsibility. Thomas Joscelyn explains the importance of this attack:

Osama bin Laden’s organization and its spin-off, IS, have fought against Iran’s proxies in Iraq and Syria for years. Killing Shiites is a blood sport for IS’s Sunni jihadists. And Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s so-called caliphate reportedly has attempted to strike inside the mullahs’ country before. The group routinely agitates against the Iranians in its videos and propaganda statements. Yet it wasn’t until now that IS successfully attacked the heart of Tehran.

Al-Qaeda’s leadership long sought to rein in the anti-Shiite violence in Iraq. . . . [U]ntil 2014, [al-Qaeda in Iraq, which later became Islamic State], abided by an order from al-Qaeda’s leaders to avoid terrorist operations inside Iranian territory and against Shiites outside of Iraq. The two sides formally split in early 2014. At that point, IS [began] waging a campaign against Shiites throughout the region—and accusing al-Qaeda of being soft on them. . . .

To this day, however, al-Qaeda avoids attacks inside Iran—at least those that can be directly attributed to the organization. (It is possible that al-Qaeda supports other regional groups that occasionally target Iranian security forces on their home turf.) Files recovered during the May 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan explain this reticence. . . .

In October 2007, bin Laden wrote a letter to [what was then known as] the Islamic State of Iraq, [in which he] disapproved of its threats against Iran [and stated that] “Iran is our main artery for funds, personnel, and communication.” Bin Laden was not against targeting Iran in principle. He simply thought the cost was too high and the benefits al-Qaeda received from the relationship were significant. The “main artery” bin Laden referenced was later targeted in a series of terrorist designations, reward offers, and other official statements by the U.S. Treasury and State Departments.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.