On Wednesday, the American government announced that it was canceling or delaying some $300 million in aid for Egypt. The decision stemmed from a combination of Congressional attempts to tie aid to Cairo to improvement in human rights, the Trump administration’s desire that Cairo direct more of the military aid it receives to counterterrorism operations, and U.S. frustration over Egyptian relations with North Korea. While acknowledging that Washington is correct to demand more in return for its aid, Eric Trager argues the decision was made so clumsily as to be self-defeating:

Washington’s concerns regarding Egypt’s dismal human-rights record, poor counterterrorism performance, and relationship with North Korea are valid. But the scattershot nature of these conditions [on aid], and the fact that bureaucratic and political considerations drove this decision rather than any overarching strategy for U.S.-Egypt relations or the broader region, reflects a policymaking process in disarray.

Whereas previous administrations’ decisions on changes to aid were announced after they were communicated to the highest levels of the Egyptian government, key Egyptian officials learned of [the recent] decision only after reading the initial Reuters report. The aid cut also comes only weeks before the United States and Cairo are scheduled to resume the biennial Bright Star joint exercises, which have been redesigned at Washington’s urging to focus on counterterrorism after a four-year hiatus.

The rollout was also poorly coordinated within the U.S. government. Indeed, the new aid policy leaked just hours before a high-level U.S. delegation—including Trump’s senior adviser Jared Kushner, Deputy National Security Advisor Dina Powell, and the Middle East peace envoy Jason Greenblatt—landed in Cairo for a meeting with President Sisi. . . .

To be sure, the ultimate impact of the aid decision is ambiguous, since most of the affected funds might ultimately be disbursed. And the administration can ease the sudden confusion in the bilateral relationship by setting clearer conditions for allowing Cairo to spend the $195 million in military aid now being delayed. Still, the way in which Washington made and announced its decision has significantly undermined the Trump administration’s credibility with Cairo, which now has reason to question whether the president’s vocal support for Sisi matters.

At the same time, the decision is a wake-up call for the Egyptian government, which can no longer afford to ignore longstanding and widely held concerns within the U.S. policy community regarding its internal and external behavior if it desires a durable and supportive relationship with Washington.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.