In a recent conversation with Mordechai Kedar, an Iraqi Sunni activist living in Europe argued that the best way forward for his own country is what he terms “the emirate solution.” His proposal, modeled on American federalism and Switzerland’s division into cantons, would divide Iraq into small, relatively homogeneous emirates, each with some degree of internal autonomy. Kedar lays out the case for this plan, and suggest it could be applied successfully elsewhere in the Middle East:

Each emirate would lead its own life and refrain from interference in the policies of the other emirates. It would be ruled by a local sheikh who originally stood at the head of the families within the emirate’s borders, following the population’s social traditions. This . . . will create harmony, stability, and peaceful relations with neighboring emirates for the good of all the citizenry.

The “emirate solution” will also grant self-rule to the Kurds of northern Iraq, making the establishment of an independent Kurdish state unnecessary and preventing the certain violent antagonism of the Iranians, Turks, and Arabs to its existence and the ensuing hostilities.

For illustration’s sake, let us recall that the Kurdish region of northern Iraq is surrounded by countries that do not share the Kurdish dreams of independence, and has no corridor to the sea. If the neighboring countries allied against the Kurdish state, should one be established, preventing goods and people from reaching it, the Kurds would have no way of leading normal lives. How would they export oil and other products in that case? How would they manage to import necessities? . . .

Interestingly, that same emirate solution could most definitely be applied to the seven cities of Judea and Samaria in addition to the Gazan emirate established a decade ago. I am not a fan of Hamas, but Gaza is a state from every practical point of view, and Israel must find a way to deter effectively the jihadist gang that has taken it over. Establishing emirates in Judea and Samaria will grant the people there stability, prosperity, and quiet. It will give Israel peace.

That same solution could solve Jordan’s problem as well. It can be divided into a Palestinian emirate, perhaps more than one, and a Bedouin emirate. The king would be a symbolic figure as is the queen of England.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.