On Monday the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released its eighth quarterly report on the Islamic Republic’s compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as the 2015 nuclear agreement is formally known. Although the document does not mention any evidence of violation of the deal’s terms, write David Albright and Andrea Sticker, it is “so sparse in detail that it is impossible to conclude that Iran is fully complying.” The IAEA, they explain, has simply not been able to conduct the inspections necessary for verification:

This report and its predecessors are deficient in reporting on the verification and monitoring of the JCPOA overall, including Section T, which entails additional Iranian declarations and access to Iranian military sites associated with banned nuclear-weapons-development activities and associated, controlled dual-use equipment [i.e., equipment that can be used for either civilian or military nuclear programs]. . . .

The IAEA overall appears to [embrace] a limited interpretation of its mandate to verify the JCPOA in what must be viewed as a stunning reversal of safeguards practices applied in countries such as South Africa and Taiwan, where it has periodically revisited sites associated with past nuclear-weapons work. . . . The IAEA’s stance on this issue in Iran is likely to be to the detriment of both the verification and the future of the JCPOA. It may also be to the detriment of future arms-control agreements and monitoring efforts involving states such as North Korea. . . .

IAEA officials stated to the media that the agency has not visited military sites in Iran to verify the absence of military nuclear-related activities and to inspect sites previously associated with such activities. [Instead, the report] states that [inspectors] had access to the sites they “needed to visit.” [Thus] the IAEA appears to be accepting a limited, counterproductive interpretation of its mandate to verify the JCPOA.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.