By sending troops to Syria, the U.S. has prevented some key locations in that country from falling into the hands of the Russian-Iranian-Syrian alliance. But, with Islamic State deprived of its territory and rebel forces on the defensive, most of the country is now under the control of Moscow and/or Tehran. This result, argues Reuel Marc Gerecht, is a sign that the White House, while saying all the right things about the nature of the Islamic Republic, has done little to accomplish its own stated goals:

What Washington needs to do to roll back Iranian gains runs smack into what the Trump administration is prepared to do, which so far hasn’t been much. The president’s rhetoric against Iranian militancy has been tougher than Ronald Reagan’s or George W. Bush’s harshest orations. But Trump’s accomplishments on the ground have been few. The administration really has two options: to punish Iran economically or to roll back the mullahs militarily through the use of U.S. forces. . . .

To punish Iran economically, the White House could withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and reinstate all of the sanctions waived by the nuclear deal. Or it could keep the accord, as it is doing, but launch a tsunami of executive-branch sanctions against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, effectively shutting off most of the trade and finance allowed by the JCPOA. Such actions would end the illogic of trying to push back against the Islamic Republic while fueling its economy. So far, the administration is doing neither. . . .

If [President Trump] walks away from his predecessor’s nuclear accord, however, the administration would have to be prepared for the clerical regime to test Washington’s resolve by openly reanimating parts of the nuclear program that had been slowed or dismantled. That means preventive military strikes, which the White House has so far shown no willingness to entertain. The same logic holds if Trump were to decide to deploy U.S. forces directly against Iran and its many Shiite militias in Syria: the nuclear deal most certainly will die when more than a handful of American soldiers perish.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.