In his recent testimony before the Senate Armed-Services Committee, James F. Jeffrey laid out a plan for pushing back against the Islamic Republic’s efforts to expand its influence across the Middle East:

The two key fronts are Iraq and Syria, which should be considered, as Iran considers them, to be one theater—but [which require] different approaches. In Iraq, [the U.S.] has a relatively friendly government led by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, deep ties with much of the population, and considerable anti-Iranian sentiment, including among some Shiite clerics. The United States should lead the international effort to integrate Iraq back into the regional and global community, including with reconstruction and energy-sector assistance. The United States should also press for a continued U.S. military training presence, to prevent a resurgence of Islamic State and ensure Iraq is not dependent on Iran for military support.

The goal should not be Iraq as a “Middle Eastern West Berlin,” which is not feasible, but rather as a Finland, which allows neither Iran nor the United States to project power out of it. The Iraqi government, egged on by Iran, should not be permitted to cherry-pick relations with us, enjoying our economic and diplomatic support while acquiescing in Iran’s subversion and military moves.

In Syria, the announcement by Defense Secretary James Mattis that U.S. troops would stay on to counter a possible return of Islamic State, build up local counterterrorism allies, and contribute to the Geneva [peace] process, is important. The United States cannot dictate events in Syria, but by its presence can contest Iran’s—and Russia’s—freedom of action. Aside from U.S. enclaves and local allies in the north and south, U.S. allies Israel and Turkey also operate militarily in Syria, and have a similar core goal of containing Iran, although differences on tactics, particularly with Turkey, are formidable.

Tamir Hayman analyzes the latest reports about an offer by Hamas to release three female soldiers in exchange for 150 captured terrorists, of whom 90 have received life sentences; then, if that exchange happens successfully, a second stage of the deal will begin.

If this does happen, Israel will release all the serious prisoners who had been sentenced to life and who are associated with Hamas, which will leave Israel without any bargaining chips for the second stage. In practice, Israel will release everyone who is important to Hamas without getting back all the hostages. In this situation, it’s evident that Israel will approach the second stage of the negotiations in the most unfavorable way possible. Hamas will achieve all its demands in the first stage, except for a commitment from Israel to end the war completely.

How does this relate to the fighting in Rafah? Hayman explains:

In the absence of an agreement or compromise by Hamas, it is detrimental for Israel to continue the static situation we were in. It is positive that new energy has entered the campaign. . . . The [capture of the] border of the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing are extremely important achievements, while the ongoing dismantling of the battalions is of secondary importance.

That being said, Hayman is critical of the approach to negotiations taken so far:

Gradual hostage trades don’t work. We must adopt a different concept of a single deal in which Israel offers a complete cessation of the war in exchange for all the hostages.