On Sunday, for the first time in nearly a decade, Lebanon held national elections. The results were good for Hizballah, which is now part of a bloc of parties commanding a parliamentary majority. To Tony Badran and Jonathan Schanzer, this victory marks a further step in the transformation of Lebanon into an Iranian satellite:

Hizballah has long had a political and military stranglehold on the Lebanese state. But now, thanks to its ever-expanding military arsenal and control over pockets of territory, coupled with new parliamentary seats captured by its representatives and allies, there can be no denying that the Shiite terrorist group dominates the Lebanese state.

American policymakers attached much significance to these elections, describing them as crucial to advancing two key elements of American policy in Lebanon: preserving the stability of the Lebanese state and strengthening its institutions. But as the elections show, this policy has only stabilized and strengthened the Iranian order in Lebanon, run by Hizballah. . . .

[Furthermore], Lebanon is a headquarters for other elements of Iran’s regional terrorist network. This is a fact the Lebanese interior minister openly acknowledged two years ago when he described Lebanon as “a global terrorist and security operations room.” Lebanon is currently the base for the senior Hamas operative Saleh Arouri, who runs terror operations in the West Bank, and other officials from the Palestinian terrorist group. It is a place where Qais al-Khazali, the commander of the Iraqi Shiite militia Asaib Ahl al-Haq, a U.S.-designated terrorist group, meets openly with Hizballah operatives. The same goes for commanders from other deadly Iran-run militias in Syria, like Liwaa al-Baqir. . . .

Lebanon’s terrorism problem isn’t going away. As the election results make painfully clear, Washington’s policy of preserving the political status quo has failed. If anything, it has absolved Lebanon of the terrorist activities conducted on its sovereign soil. Even today, our officials speak about buttressing the country’s institutions, namely the banking sector and the Lebanese military, as a counterweight to Hizballah. . . . The problem is that these institutions are hardly fighting against Iran’s network.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.