In the latest evidence that the British Labor party’s problem is one of anti-Semitism rather than criticism of Israel, a recording surfaced Monday night of a party official, Peter Willsman, delivering a tirade about Jews at a meeting of its executive committee. Helen Lewis examines his words:

Importantly, there is no record of [the party leader Jeremy] Corbyn intervening to stop Willsman fulminating about how Jewish “Trump fanatics” were spreading false claims of anti-Semitism, or criticizing the 68 rabbis who signed an open letter saying that the party had a problem. . . .

[T]he “Trump fanatic” comment is typical of the pro-Corbyn memes which circulate on social media and are given impetus through pro-Corbyn websites. . . . Put simply, for sites such as these, the default assumption is that criticism of Corbyn is motivated by a “centrist” or “Blairite” agenda—or perhaps even by actual right-wingers. . . . Corbyn’s team, and Corbyn himself, have encouraged this narrative: that criticism is never valid, can never be valid, because it is never motivated by anything other than knee-jerk opposition to Corbyn’s socialist program. This line of thinking is, frankly, conspiracist. We also know where it ends: with one Labor councilor wondering if there is a “Mossad-assisted campaign to prevent the election of a Labor government pledged to recognize Palestine as a state” and another hosting Facebook posts under his name about “blood-drinking Jews.” . . .

Corbyn—a lifelong anti-racist activist and campaigner against apartheid—seems unable to recognize that he might have a blind spot, even when hundreds of members of a community try to tell him so. Some of his supporters, meanwhile, appear to want an impossible standard of proof before they will acknowledge the existence of anti-Semitism in the party. A higher standard of proof than posts about blood-drinking Jews. . . .

There is nothing left to say on Labor’s anti-Semitism row. If you don’t think there is a problem by this point, then surely nothing can change your mind. In fact, you are the problem.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.