In April, the Syrian government enacted Law Number 10, which determines how the regime will prioritize the reconstruction of the country’s war-torn areas. One of the law’s clauses will make it very difficult for internal refugees—those displaced elsewhere in the country due to the fighting—to reclaim real property they abandoned. Ibrahim Abu Ahmad argues that there is something more sinister in this law than mere red tape or even avarice:

Government actions [such as this] appear designed to tip the balance of power among the country’s different ethnic groups in Bashar al-Assad’s favor by blocking Sunni refugees’ returns to certain strategic areas of Assad-controlled territories. If Sunnis, [long the majority religious group in Syria], become less than 50 percent of the population, other minorities could create an effective majority that will be able to stand against Sunni Syrian interests. Indeed, if Assad, [who, along with much of his ruling clique, is not Sunni but Alawite], were to succeed in creating a Syria where Sunnis are no longer a majority of the population, he may be able to place increasing pressure on a group that already has a tense relationship with Syria’s minorities, and is now in addition blamed by Assad’s supporters for the war [itself]. . . .

[T]he ambiguity in the law’s wording has raised speculation that this legislation is part of a government initiative to gain control over vast swaths of personal property by enabling the state to become the final determinant of which civilians will reside where in postwar Syria. Many Syrians fear that the government intends to redistribute the properties of its Sunni citizens to Assad supporters and non-Syrian Shiite proxies, providing residences for Shiite forces and their families and thus making permanent their presence in the country. . . .

Assad is trying to secure strategic areas in Syria by creating a majority-non-Sunni population there, which will enable him to tighten his control over Syria with less cost and more efficiency. This will also serve the interests of Iran, which would like to form a Shiite corridor from Tehran to Beirut.

Tamir Hayman analyzes the latest reports about an offer by Hamas to release three female soldiers in exchange for 150 captured terrorists, of whom 90 have received life sentences; then, if that exchange happens successfully, a second stage of the deal will begin.

If this does happen, Israel will release all the serious prisoners who had been sentenced to life and who are associated with Hamas, which will leave Israel without any bargaining chips for the second stage. In practice, Israel will release everyone who is important to Hamas without getting back all the hostages. In this situation, it’s evident that Israel will approach the second stage of the negotiations in the most unfavorable way possible. Hamas will achieve all its demands in the first stage, except for a commitment from Israel to end the war completely.

How does this relate to the fighting in Rafah? Hayman explains:

In the absence of an agreement or compromise by Hamas, it is detrimental for Israel to continue the static situation we were in. It is positive that new energy has entered the campaign. . . . The [capture of the] border of the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing are extremely important achievements, while the ongoing dismantling of the battalions is of secondary importance.

That being said, Hayman is critical of the approach to negotiations taken so far:

Gradual hostage trades don’t work. We must adopt a different concept of a single deal in which Israel offers a complete cessation of the war in exchange for all the hostages.