Last week, an Iran-backed militia fired rockets at an American based in Iraq—the eleventh such attack in the past three months—killing an American contractor. Washington, at last, retaliated by striking five different targets belonging to Katai’b Hizballah, the most prominent of these militias, in both Iraq and Syria. In response, the group sent a well-organized mob to attack the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. Behnam Ben Taleblu points out that this is not a case of “nationalist backlash” against the American presence in the country, but an Iranian intimidation tactic. He adds:

For Washington’s strikes to create a deterrence dividend, Iran, as well as its proxies and partners, . . . need to see any U.S. show of force as a signal of resolve, rather than a one-off, which would in fact signal weakness and thus invite Tehran to escalate further. Washington therefore cannot shy away from using all elements of national power. By keeping hard power in reserve until the loss of an American life, the administration may have inadvertently signaled that the rest of Iran’s malign activities—so long as they don’t threaten Americans—will be treated as [of only secondary importance].

In just six months, Tehran went from damaging oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz to launching cruise missiles against what is arguably the most important oil installation on the planet. At no point was there any [U.S. military] retribution against a regime asset or interest—even indirectly, outside of Iranian territory. And because of that, at no point did Tehran look for an off-ramp.

In fact, the motive behind the crescendo of aggression by Iran is clear. The Trump administration’s overall approach is working. . . . Greatly akin to asphyxiation, the sanctions regime unlocked by Washington’s departure from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal has choked-off Iran’s revenues. . . . But like trying to choke an adversary in a fight, . . . the greater the asphyxiation, the more flagrant the hand-waving (in this context: regional and other escalation) and flailing.

This flailing, Taleblu concludes, must be met with a firm response, preferably military.

While conventional wisdom in the Western press believes that the war with Hamas has left Jerusalem more isolated and scuttled chances of expanding the Abraham Accords, Gabriel Scheinmann points to a very different reality. He begins with Iran’s massive drone and missile attack on Israel last month, and the coalition that helped defend against it:

America’s Arab allies had, in various ways, provided intelligence and allowed U.S. and Israeli planes to operate in their airspace. Jordan, which has been vociferously attacking Israel’s conduct in Gaza for months, even publicly acknowledged that it shot down incoming Iranian projectiles. When the chips were down, the Arab coalition held and made clear where they stood in the broader Iranian war on Israel.

The successful batting away of the Iranian air assault also engendered awe in Israel’s air-defense capabilities, which have performed marvelously throughout the war. . . . Israel’s response to the Iranian night of missiles should give further courage to Saudi Arabia to codify its alignment. Israel . . . telegraphed clearly to Tehran that it could hit precise targets without its aircraft being endangered and that the threshold of a direct Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear or other sites had been breached.

The entire episode demonstrated that Israel can both hit Iranian sites and defend against an Iranian response. At a time when the United States is focused on de-escalation and restraint, Riyadh could see quite clearly that only Israel has both the capability and the will to deal with the Iranian threat.

It is impossible to know whether the renewed U.S.-Saudi-Israel negotiations will lead to a normalization deal in the immediate months ahead. . . . Regardless of the status of this deal, [however], or how difficult the war in Gaza may appear, America’s Arab allies have now become Israel’s.