In October 2020, Jeremy Corbyn—under whose prior leadership the British Labor party had become a cesspool of anti-Semitism—was suspended from the party altogether after saying that anti-Semitism among its members was “dramatically overstated.” His successor, Keir Starmer, has since tried to rectify the situation, and has made multiple overtures to the Jewish community. In an interview, Jake Wallis Simmons challenged Starmer about his longstanding fealty to Corbyn as well as his plans to make Labor more welcoming to Jews.

Would Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer be, as they say, “good for the Jews”? Since the Corbyn years, this has become an inevitable question. And it is possible to argue that he would.

Sir Keir and his Jewish wife, Victoria, are members of St. John’s Wood Liberal Synagogue and are bringing their children up with a sense of Jewish identity. He has repeatedly vowed to tear out anti-Semitism “by the roots.” When we met on Monday in a comically cramped cloakroom in a nursery in Harrow, he made a point of mentioning that he had extended family in Israel.

Yet for much of the community, the jury remains firmly out on the former head of the Crown Prosecution Service. A recent poll has suggested that 65 percent of Jews still find Labor unwelcoming, as the shadow of Corbynism continues to darken local branches. It darkens parts of the opposition benches in Parliament as well. It’s hard to forget that Sir Keir was one of Jeremy Corbyn’s longest-serving shadow-cabinet members, clocking up 1,559 days under his leadership. In July 2019, he said he had “full confidence” in Mr. Corbyn as—believe it or not—the right man to root out Jew-hatred in the party.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.