Besides exerting de-facto control over Lebanon and much of Yemen, and commanding a great deal of influence in Syria, the Islamic Republic has established itself as a major player in Iraq, where its Shiite militias wield considerable power—as do a number of pro-Iranian politicians. But Baghdad now seems to be coming out of several months of political deadlock, and how the current crisis is resolved may determine whether Tehran is able to hold on to the influence it has acquired. Munqith Dagher explains:

On October 13, Iraqis woke to the sound of nine Katyusha rockets falling on the Green Zone before the special session of parliament that was to be held to select the new Iraqi president. But these rockets were no celebratory shots marking a breakthrough one year after the last Iraqi elections. Although security forces blocked all the roads leading to the Green Zone in order to prevent any demonstrators, they still failed to stop [pro-Iranian] armed factions from expressing their unhappiness about the election of Abdul Latif Rashid to the office of Iraq’s fourth president since the fall of the regime in 2003.

The question now is whether the October Movement—which takes its name from the popular uprising against Iranian influence that began in the southern part of the country in October 2019—will be able to exert political power:

The October Movement, which forced the former prime minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi to resign [in 2019], has now lost much of its momentum as a result of being a main target for disinformation and physical attacks from militias and pro-Iranian forces in Iraq. Ideological conflicts and leadership disputes within the movement as well as clashes with the [followers of the powerful Shiite, but not reliably pro-Iranian, cleric Muqtada al-Sadr] also led to the splintering of these forces and further loss of momentum.

Nevertheless, although the movement has lost much of its energy, its ideas remain firmly planted in the minds of most Iraqis, especially the youth. The memory of what was achieved in 2019-2020 remains present for everyday Iraqis and continues to frighten political parties in power. Although the number who went out into the streets on the third anniversary of the October uprising was smaller than expected, there were calls for broader action and it is still possible that a larger demonstration could be organized for October 25.

The choice of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani as prime minister—a politician who had previously been nominated by pro-Iranian forces during the October uprising and whom the October Movement had previously opposed due to his close ties to [pro-Iranian politicians]—will pose a new challenge to the will of the October Movement. It remains to be seen whether these events will prompt youth in Baghdad and southern Iraq to protest further against the regime.

With the IDF engaged in ground maneuvers in both northern and southern Gaza, and a plan about to go into effect next week that would separate more than 100,000 civilians from Hamas’s control, an end to the war may at last be in sight. Yet there seems to be no agreement within Israel, or without, about what should become of the territory. Efraim Inbar assesses the various proposals, from Donald Trump’s plan to remove the population entirely, to the Israeli far-right’s desire to settle the Strip with Jews, to the internationally supported proposal to place Gaza under the control of the Palestinian Authority (PA)—and exposes the fatal flaws of each. He therefore tries to reframe the problem:

[M]any Arab states have failed to establish a monopoly on the use of force within their borders. Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Sudan all suffer from civil wars or armed militias that do not obey the central government.

Perhaps Israel needs to get used to the idea that in the absence of an entity willing to take Gaza under its wing, chaos will prevail there. This is less terrible than people may think. Chaos would allow Israel to establish buffer zones along the Gaza border without interference. Any entity controlling Gaza would oppose such measures and would resist necessary Israeli measures to reduce terrorism. Chaos may also encourage emigration.

Israel is doomed to live with bad neighbors for the foreseeable future. There is no way to ensure zero terrorism. Israel should avoid adopting a policy of containment and should constantly “mow the grass” to minimize the chances of a major threat emerging across the border. Periodic conflicts may be necessary. If the Jews want a state in their homeland, they need to internalize that Israel will have to live by the sword for many more years.