The recent decision taken by the OPEC+ cartel, with the full support of Saudi Arabia, to raise the price of oil has further exacerbated the growing rift between the Washington and Riyadh, and left many in the U.S.—especially those aligned with the Democratic party—furious. But, as Hussein Ibish explains, the reasons behind the kingdom’s decision have much to do with its economic agenda for the coming decades, and little to do with the priorities of its American critics:

The U.S. perception is that Saudi Arabia [has] sided with Moscow, given that high oil prices will strengthen the Russian economy against sanctions. The Saudis have also stumbled into U.S. domestic politics. Democrats in general have a negative view of Saudi Arabia, . . . partly rooted in the perception that the Saudis are aligned with Republicans, especially former President Donald Trump. They assume Riyadh is attempting to put its thumb on the scale to help Republicans in next month’s congressional elections and even set the stage for a Trump comeback.

The Saudis weren’t thinking about Ukraine—like many people in Asia and Africa, they don’t think in absolute terms of being pro- or anti-Russian—although that was certainly shortsighted. And it’s frankly narcissistic for Democrats to imagine that the Saudis are adjusting their national grand strategy around the upcoming midterm vote. Once the Trump administration declined to respond to the devastating Iranian drone and missile attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities in September 2019, any lingering sense that Republicans were the answer for Saudi concerns evaporated.

But the countries do still need each other. Only the U.S. can provide Saudi Arabia the security it requires. And the Saudis are the only plausible regional partner for the still-strategically crucial U.S. dominance in the waterways of the Persian Gulf, which constitutes one of Washington’s most potent forms of leverage over rivals like China.

After tempers cool, the U.S. needs to formulate a new security commitment to Gulf Arab states, including Saudi Arabia. This would effectively update the 1979 Carter doctrine—a pledge to rebuff any nation that attempts to dominate the Gulf by force—and respond to contemporary threats like the 2019 missile attacks. And that agreement, of course, would be contingent on the Gulf Arabs renewing their commitment to U.S. interests and Washington’s global as well as regional strategies.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.