To Richard Goldberg, Washington’s decision to release $6 billion in frozen funds to Tehran in exchange for the freeing of five Americans being held illegally will give the ayatollahs more money to spend on weapons and terrorism while encouraging hostage-taking by Russia, China, and other bad actors. Worse still, Goldberg writes, it is only part of a larger strategic mistake:

After more than two years of policy failure—offering Iran massive sanctions relief to return to the 2015 nuclear deal while allowing Tehran to enrich more uranium to higher levels than ever before—the Biden administration faced an increasingly likely prospect that Iran would become a recognized nuclear-threshold regime on its watch by producing weapons-grade uranium. The White House faced a choice: establish a credible military threat to deter Iran from further nuclear escalation and restore a maximalist sanctions approach, or offer to pay Tehran’s price to postpone a crisis for eighteen months. President Biden chose the latter.

In early May, Biden’s Middle East czar passed messages to Ayatollah [Ali Khamenei] through Oman, suggesting both sides agree to a temporary period of de-escalation wherein the U.S. would loosen its grip on Iran’s economy and Iran would hold off on enriching uranium to weapons-grade purity. The arrangement would not be labeled a “deal,” since a “deal” would need to be submitted to Congress for review—and possible rejection. Instead, Washington would open all relief valves it could find without triggering a 2015 law that gives Congress the right to veto such an arrangement.

To access all that and more, all Iran must do is not enrich uranium to a higher level and give the appearance of slowing its production of highly enriched uranium—even though the 60-percent-enriched uranium it produces every day is already 99 percent of the way to weapons-grade. The deal is exactly what Iran wants: maintain the stockpile and technical capacity rapidly to produce weapons-grade uranium until its advanced centrifuges are perfected and its new underground facility completed. When that day comes, the game is over and Khamenei wins.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.