What is to be done about the anti-Semitism that seems to be bursting forth everywhere? Discussions often run aground on the problems of protecting freedom of speech and making fine distinctions between anti-Semitism and criticism of Israel. But Yuval Levin explains that these aren’t, in fact, particularly intricate problems and, moreover, that there are clearcut policy solutions:

The students left to cower in their dorms at Cornell or the New Jersey residents vaguely warned by federal officials to “take all security precautions to protect your community” . . . could tell you that the problem is not speech but hateful intimidation. The boundaries between the two are not unexplored in our laws. They can sometimes be vague, and in those instances, some balance must be sought between rights of expression and the imperative of physical security. But they are often not vague at all. The states and the federal government have statutes in place to protect Americans subjected to terror tactics and hate crimes. Yet anti-Semitism can sometimes fall between the cracks of such laws, and of their enforcement.

This is in part because . . . contemporary left-wing anti-Semitism so often treats Israel as its subject but American Jews as its object. Concerns about it are frequently dismissed because its practitioners insist they are criticizing a foreign government, not fellow Americans. Yet their criticism is not a policy argument but a denial of Israel’s right to exist on the basis of its Jewish character, and they themselves plainly behave as though that message should have implications for Jews in America.

In this respect, anti-Zionism is not about geopolitics; it is about Jews. It is generally easy to distinguish from criticism of the particular actions of any Israeli government, and all the more so when it is attached to the intimidation of particular Americans on the basis of their Jewish identity.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.