Bad as the wave of anti-Semitism in the U.S. has been, it seems less intense than what has been transpiring in Montreal. There were at least three incidents where shots were fired at Jewish schools, four attacks on synagogues or Jewish community centers with firebombs or Molotov cocktails, and dozens of cases of anti-Semitic graffiti, vicious anti-Israel protests, and so forth. Warren Kinsella comments:

In none of the most serious cases, all crimes, has an arrest been made. And Jews who spoke to . . . reporters declined to give their names—or report to police other anti-Semitic crimes—because they feared retribution. That is Montreal since October 7. This city has experienced more hate crimes against Jews than any other North American city. . . . What the hell is happening here?

“The reason that Montreal is the only city in North America that has had multiple violent targeted attacks against Jewish institutions and people—from gunshots to Molotov cocktails—is because there is no condemnation of jihadist behavior taking place on the streets of Montreal. None. We need a political voice to say, ‘Enough!’ But we don’t have it.”

Beryl Wajsman, the articulate and passionate editor of Montreal’s award-winning newspaper the Suburban, pauses. He looks more angry than sad. . . . Wajsman says [the city’s mayor] Valerie Plante is much more preoccupied with greening the city and “the war on the car” than she is with the safety of Montreal’s Jews. That has sent a message to Montreal’s pro-Hamas fanatics, he says. “They know they’re not going to be taken in by the police. They know they can trespass, and block traffic, and more.”

And they’re paid to do so, he says. Pro-Hamas protesters can get up to $50 for each protest they attend, he claims, and they’ve divided the city up into grids, with leaders responsible for each grid.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.