Religion, Not Government Subsidies, Leads People to Have More Children

Dec. 22 2023

Falling birthrates in developed countries have led to numerous proposals, some of which have been implemented, about how to reverse the trend. Catherine Ruth Pakaluk argues that most people seeking to solve the problem are going about it wrong:

South Korea suffers the world’s lowest birthrates—0.71 expected births per woman. In the city of Seoul, that number is just 0.59. The South Korean government estimates that it has spent $210 billion trying to revive its gasping birthrate. The cash hasn’t worked. It hasn’t worked anywhere it’s been tried.

Pronatalist policy proposals in the U.S. make two faulty assumptions about falling birthrates. First, that religious outliers [who have several children] have zero relevance for reviving American families. Second, that we can incentivize anything we want with tax and subsidy schemes.

Pakaluk has spent the past four years traveling around America speaking with women who have chosen to have large families. Many are deeply religious. Among them is Leah, who, along with her husband, embraced Orthodox Judaism while in college:

Leah’s story made it excruciatingly obvious why child subsidies won’t raise the birthrate. Cash incentives can’t answer what needs to be answered: a reason to give up dreams and aspirations that can’t hang on past one or two kids. We know we can incentivize moving away from oil, cigarettes, and Big Gulps. But can we incentivize moving away from careers and interests we’ve prepared women to fulfill from their earliest school days? My research suggested that such a choice comes from deep within. It must be wanted for its own sake, counted as worth the costs, which are personal and subjective.

Read more at Fusion

More about: Family, Family policy, Fertility, Religion

What’s Behind Hamas’s Threat to Stall the Release of Hostages, and How Israel Should Respond

Feb. 12 2025

Hamas declared yesterday that it won’t release more hostages “until further notice.” Given the timing and wording of the announcement—several days before the release was supposed to take place, and speaking of a delay rather than a halt—Ron Ben-Yishai concludes that it is a negotiating tactic, aimed at “creating a temporary crisis to gain leverage.” Therefore, writes Ben-Yishai, “Hamas may reverse its decision by Saturday.” He adds:

Israel cannot afford to concede to Hamas’s demands beyond what is already outlined in the agreement, as doing so would invite continuous extortion throughout the negotiation process, further delaying hostage releases.

The group sees the public outrage and growing calls for action following the release of hostages in severe medical condition as an opportunity to extract more concessions. These demands include not only a rapid start to negotiations on the next phase of the deal and an end to the war but also smaller, immediate benefits, particularly improved conditions for displaced Gazans.

Beyond these tactical objectives, Hamas has another goal—one that Israelis do not always recognize: inflicting psychological pain on the Israeli public. The group benefits from, and perhaps even draws strength from, the anguish and emotional distress in Israel, as well as the testimonies of freed hostages detailing the abuse they endured. Hamas wants these stories to be heard—not only to pressure the Israeli government but also because, in the eyes of its supporters, Israel’s suffering is its ultimate victory.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, Israeli Security