In America, there has been much discussion about how the universities have become incubators for anti-Semitism. This problem is, if anything, worse in Great Britain. So what happens when a prestigious London college offers a course for civil servants on counterterrorism? Anna Stanley recently found out:

In the introduction to the course, labeling an organization as terrorist was described as a problem because it “implies a moral judgment.” Nothing was said about why a moral judgment might be appropriate.

There was an irony to being surrounded by civil servants who hate the concept of the state. As young professionals, they represented a microcosm of the views emanating from British universities: when it comes to extremism and counterterrorism, the state is not to be trusted. The head of Security Studies at Kings College read concernedly, “Problems of definitions: labeling a group terrorist can increase the state’s power.” The civil servants nodded in agreement.

We were told some consider Hamas terrorists as freedom fighters whereas Israel was provided as a prime example when considering the question of whether a state can commit terrorism. In the introduction, one slide read “condemning terrorism is to endorse the power of the strong over the weak,” a dangerous conclusion breeding anti-Israel positions.

Another slide read, “Terrorism is not the problem, rather the systems they [sic] oppose are terrorist,” reflecting post-modern identity politics wrapped up as counterterrorism education.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.