Gaza, however, is but one part of a much larger conflict. In December, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant referred to the war with Iran taking place on seven fronts—the others being Lebanon, Syria, Judea and Samaria, Iraq, Yemen, and Iran. Seen from this perspective, it might be better to speak of a confrontation between Washington and Tehran, one which the former appears reluctant to want to acknowledge. The editors of the Washington Free Beacon write:

If the Biden administration has articulated one goal since Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel, it is to prevent the outbreak of a broader regional war. . . . As with so many of this administration’s foreign-policy initiatives, Iran had other ideas.

As Eli Lake details, the U.S.-Iran conflict has been going on for years, and claimed the lives of over 600 American servicemen in Iraq, and recently those of two navy SEALs in the Indian Ocean. The Free Beacon continues:

Any actual clear-eyed analysis would start and end with Iran, which has been waging a proxy war against the United States for decades. That includes during Barack Obama’s nuclear deal, when Iran took the pallets of cash it received and poured the money into its terror proxies throughout the Middle East. Now, as Iran wages a regional war, the Biden administration’s responses in Iraq and Yemen have been limited to the appendages of the Iranian hydra. To stem this conflict and prevent it from growing further, we must attack it straight on.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.