On Thursday, Iran-backed Houthi rebels carried out further attacks in the Red Sea, sending a message that they are not deterred by the U.S.-led alliance to keep the maritime corridor open. Thanks to the Suez Canal, the Red Sea links the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, and some 15 percent of global shipping normally passes through it. The Houthis’ repeated acts of piracy have led to rising insurance costs and the rerouting of vessels, resulting, as Matthew Kroenig and Jeffrey Cimmino write, in “shipping delays, disrupted supply chains, and higher costs to deliver goods.”

Kroenig and Cimmino argue that the U.S. must respond much more firmly to improve the situation:

The United States has played defense, putting together an international Red Sea Task Force to escort commercial ships, employing air and missile defenses to shoot down incoming drone and missile strikes, and sinking Houthi boats in self-defense from an attempted hijacking. The United States has also engaged in a small number of pinprick attacks directly against Iranian-backed proxy groups in Iraq and Syria.

The Biden administration has reportedly stepped cautiously because it fears “escalation.” . . . If America’s foremost priority is to avoid escalation, then it essentially hands the initiative to its more ruthless adversaries—those who are willing to escalate militarily in order to achieve their goals.

Deterrence works by convincing an adversary that the costs of attacking the United States and its allies and interests greatly outweighs any conceivable benefits. . . . This means the United States should hit Iran hard. It could retaliate directly against the Houthis’ military infrastructure. It could roll up Iranian proxy networks in the region. It could sink the Iranian navy. It could strike Iranian naval bases, or even seize this opportunity to degrade Iran’s nuclear and missile program. These are all steps the president can take on his own initiative consistent with the 1973 War Powers Act. U.S. actions of this magnitude would convey to Iran that it miscalculated and that attacking the United States was a foolish decision that should not be repeated.

The United States is still a military superpower. It should act like it. Iran—not the United States—should be cowering in fear of escalation.

Yesterday, reports appeared on social media of Iranian government ships exploding in Iranian coastal waters. Who, if anyone, is responsible, or if these reports are accurate, remains to be seen.

While President Trump has begun his term with a flurry of executive orders, their implementation is another matter. David Wurmser surveys the bureaucratic hurdles facing new presidents, and sets forth what he thinks should be the most important concerns for the White House regarding the Middle East:

The cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas may be necessary in order to retrieve whatever live hostages Israel is able to repatriate. Retrieving those hostages has been an Israeli war aim from day one.

But it is a vital American interest . . . to allow Israel to restart the war in Gaza and complete the destruction of Hamas, and also to allow Israel to enforce unilaterally UN Security Council Resolutions 1701 and 1559, which are embedded in the Lebanon cease-fire. If Hamas emerges with a story of victory in any form, not only will Israel face another October 7 soon, and not only will anti-Semitism explode exponentially globally, but cities and towns all over the West will suffer from a newly energized and encouraged global jihadist effort.

After the last hostage Israel can hope to still retrieve has been liberated, Israel will have to finish the war in a way that results in an unambiguous, incontrovertible, complete victory.