On Thursday, Iran-backed Houthi rebels carried out further attacks in the Red Sea, sending a message that they are not deterred by the U.S.-led alliance to keep the maritime corridor open. Thanks to the Suez Canal, the Red Sea links the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, and some 15 percent of global shipping normally passes through it. The Houthis’ repeated acts of piracy have led to rising insurance costs and the rerouting of vessels, resulting, as Matthew Kroenig and Jeffrey Cimmino write, in “shipping delays, disrupted supply chains, and higher costs to deliver goods.”

Kroenig and Cimmino argue that the U.S. must respond much more firmly to improve the situation:

The United States has played defense, putting together an international Red Sea Task Force to escort commercial ships, employing air and missile defenses to shoot down incoming drone and missile strikes, and sinking Houthi boats in self-defense from an attempted hijacking. The United States has also engaged in a small number of pinprick attacks directly against Iranian-backed proxy groups in Iraq and Syria.

The Biden administration has reportedly stepped cautiously because it fears “escalation.” . . . If America’s foremost priority is to avoid escalation, then it essentially hands the initiative to its more ruthless adversaries—those who are willing to escalate militarily in order to achieve their goals.

Deterrence works by convincing an adversary that the costs of attacking the United States and its allies and interests greatly outweighs any conceivable benefits. . . . This means the United States should hit Iran hard. It could retaliate directly against the Houthis’ military infrastructure. It could roll up Iranian proxy networks in the region. It could sink the Iranian navy. It could strike Iranian naval bases, or even seize this opportunity to degrade Iran’s nuclear and missile program. These are all steps the president can take on his own initiative consistent with the 1973 War Powers Act. U.S. actions of this magnitude would convey to Iran that it miscalculated and that attacking the United States was a foolish decision that should not be repeated.

The United States is still a military superpower. It should act like it. Iran—not the United States—should be cowering in fear of escalation.

Yesterday, reports appeared on social media of Iranian government ships exploding in Iranian coastal waters. Who, if anyone, is responsible, or if these reports are accurate, remains to be seen.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.