Only a Muscular American Response Will Deter Iran

On Thursday, Iran-backed Houthi rebels carried out further attacks in the Red Sea, sending a message that they are not deterred by the U.S.-led alliance to keep the maritime corridor open. Thanks to the Suez Canal, the Red Sea links the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, and some 15 percent of global shipping normally passes through it. The Houthis’ repeated acts of piracy have led to rising insurance costs and the rerouting of vessels, resulting, as Matthew Kroenig and Jeffrey Cimmino write, in “shipping delays, disrupted supply chains, and higher costs to deliver goods.”

Kroenig and Cimmino argue that the U.S. must respond much more firmly to improve the situation:

The United States has played defense, putting together an international Red Sea Task Force to escort commercial ships, employing air and missile defenses to shoot down incoming drone and missile strikes, and sinking Houthi boats in self-defense from an attempted hijacking. The United States has also engaged in a small number of pinprick attacks directly against Iranian-backed proxy groups in Iraq and Syria.

The Biden administration has reportedly stepped cautiously because it fears “escalation.” . . . If America’s foremost priority is to avoid escalation, then it essentially hands the initiative to its more ruthless adversaries—those who are willing to escalate militarily in order to achieve their goals.

Deterrence works by convincing an adversary that the costs of attacking the United States and its allies and interests greatly outweighs any conceivable benefits. . . . This means the United States should hit Iran hard. It could retaliate directly against the Houthis’ military infrastructure. It could roll up Iranian proxy networks in the region. It could sink the Iranian navy. It could strike Iranian naval bases, or even seize this opportunity to degrade Iran’s nuclear and missile program. These are all steps the president can take on his own initiative consistent with the 1973 War Powers Act. U.S. actions of this magnitude would convey to Iran that it miscalculated and that attacking the United States was a foolish decision that should not be repeated.

The United States is still a military superpower. It should act like it. Iran—not the United States—should be cowering in fear of escalation.

Yesterday, reports appeared on social media of Iranian government ships exploding in Iranian coastal waters. Who, if anyone, is responsible, or if these reports are accurate, remains to be seen.

Read more at Dispatch

More about: Iran, Red Sea, U.S. Foreign policy, Yemen

What Iran Seeks to Get from Cease-Fire Negotiations

June 20 2025

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.

Read more at Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs

More about: Iran, Israeli Security, U.S. Foreign policy