On Monday and Tuesday, American and British planes again struck Yemen’s Houthi rebels, but to no avail: yesterday, the Iran-backed terrorists fired missiles at two U.S.-flagged ships carrying cargo for the American government. The situation seems to require more serious action on Washington’s part. Yet an unnamed senior administration official told Politico that the White House is instead hoping that “regional countries and other nations with an interest in open sea lanes—China, for example—will demand an end to the shipping crisis.”

It’s far from clear why other countries’ demands will be more effective that America’s if not backed up by credible threats of economic or military consequences. As for the idea that China will play an effective role in mitigating the crisis, Ori Sela and Assaf Orion explain why that is extremely unlikely:

Let there be no mistake; the Houthi attacks affect China significantly—directly because they threaten its freedom of navigation and security, and indirectly, because they influence the safety of Chinese investments and citizens in the region, which are critical for China. . . . Why, then, has China so far failed to respond officially in words or deeds?

China regards every situation as an opportunity to saddle the U.S. with responsibility and blame, while China purportedly behaves responsibly by calling for stability and global peace. . . . Were China to join forces with the U.S. against the Houthis, this would be liable to be interpreted (above all in China itself) as acceptance of American dominance and cooperation with an actor whom China has repeatedly portrayed as the main problem in the Middle East.

China’s social media have also avoided mentioning the damage to China—economic and specifically to Chinese ships—and have even praised the Houthis as righteous fighters against evildoers (i.e., the U.S. and Israel). . . . A December 19 editorial in the Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece Global Times argued that the “crisis” in the Red Sea was a “butterfly effect” of the war in Gaza, and that the real problem was not the Houthis, but Israel—which refuses to agree to an immediate ceasefire—and perhaps above all, the U.S.

China provides security to no one, and its forces in the region prove irrelevant when put to the test.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.