On Monday and Tuesday, American and British planes again struck Yemen’s Houthi rebels, but to no avail: yesterday, the Iran-backed terrorists fired missiles at two U.S.-flagged ships carrying cargo for the American government. The situation seems to require more serious action on Washington’s part. Yet an unnamed senior administration official told Politico that the White House is instead hoping that “regional countries and other nations with an interest in open sea lanes—China, for example—will demand an end to the shipping crisis.”

It’s far from clear why other countries’ demands will be more effective that America’s if not backed up by credible threats of economic or military consequences. As for the idea that China will play an effective role in mitigating the crisis, Ori Sela and Assaf Orion explain why that is extremely unlikely:

Let there be no mistake; the Houthi attacks affect China significantly—directly because they threaten its freedom of navigation and security, and indirectly, because they influence the safety of Chinese investments and citizens in the region, which are critical for China. . . . Why, then, has China so far failed to respond officially in words or deeds?

China regards every situation as an opportunity to saddle the U.S. with responsibility and blame, while China purportedly behaves responsibly by calling for stability and global peace. . . . Were China to join forces with the U.S. against the Houthis, this would be liable to be interpreted (above all in China itself) as acceptance of American dominance and cooperation with an actor whom China has repeatedly portrayed as the main problem in the Middle East.

China’s social media have also avoided mentioning the damage to China—economic and specifically to Chinese ships—and have even praised the Houthis as righteous fighters against evildoers (i.e., the U.S. and Israel). . . . A December 19 editorial in the Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece Global Times argued that the “crisis” in the Red Sea was a “butterfly effect” of the war in Gaza, and that the real problem was not the Houthis, but Israel—which refuses to agree to an immediate ceasefire—and perhaps above all, the U.S.

China provides security to no one, and its forces in the region prove irrelevant when put to the test.

Yesterday, the beepers used by hundreds of Hizballah operatives were detonated. Noah Rothman puts this ingenious attack in the context of the overall war between Israel and the Iran-backed terrorist group:

[W]hile the disabling of an untold number of Hizballah operatives is remarkable, it’s also ominous. This week, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant told reporters that the hour is nearing when Israeli forces will have to confront Iran’s cat’s-paw in southern Lebanon directly, in order to return the tens of thousands of Israelis who fled their homes along Lebanon’s border under fire and have not yet been able to return. Today’s operation may be a prelude to the next phase of Israel’s defensive war, a dangerous one in which the IDF will face off against an enemy with tens of thousands of fighters and over 150,000 rockets and missiles trained on Israeli cities.

Seth Frantzman, meanwhile, focuses on the specific damage the pager bombings have likely done to Hizballah:

This will put the men in hospital for a period of time. Some of them can go back to serving Hizballah, but they will not have access to one of their hands. These will most likely be their dominant hand, meaning the hand they’d also use to hold the trigger of a rifle or push the button to launch a missile.

Hizballah has already lost around 450 fighters in its eleven-month confrontation with Israel. This is a significant loss for the group. While Hizballah can replace losses, it doesn’t have an endlessly deep [supply of recruits]. This is not only because it has to invest in training and security ahead of recruitment, but also because it draws its recruits from a narrow spectrum of Lebanese society.

The overall challenge for Hizballah is not just replacing wounded and dead fighters. The group will be challenged to . . . roll out some other way to communicate with its men. The use of pagers may seem archaic, but Hizballah apparently chose to use this system because it assumed the network could not be penetrated. . . . It will also now be concerned about the penetration of its operational security. When groups like Hizballah are in chaos, they are more vulnerable to making mistakes.