On Monday and Tuesday, American and British planes again struck Yemen’s Houthi rebels, but to no avail: yesterday, the Iran-backed terrorists fired missiles at two U.S.-flagged ships carrying cargo for the American government. The situation seems to require more serious action on Washington’s part. Yet an unnamed senior administration official told Politico that the White House is instead hoping that “regional countries and other nations with an interest in open sea lanes—China, for example—will demand an end to the shipping crisis.”

It’s far from clear why other countries’ demands will be more effective that America’s if not backed up by credible threats of economic or military consequences. As for the idea that China will play an effective role in mitigating the crisis, Ori Sela and Assaf Orion explain why that is extremely unlikely:

Let there be no mistake; the Houthi attacks affect China significantly—directly because they threaten its freedom of navigation and security, and indirectly, because they influence the safety of Chinese investments and citizens in the region, which are critical for China. . . . Why, then, has China so far failed to respond officially in words or deeds?

China regards every situation as an opportunity to saddle the U.S. with responsibility and blame, while China purportedly behaves responsibly by calling for stability and global peace. . . . Were China to join forces with the U.S. against the Houthis, this would be liable to be interpreted (above all in China itself) as acceptance of American dominance and cooperation with an actor whom China has repeatedly portrayed as the main problem in the Middle East.

China’s social media have also avoided mentioning the damage to China—economic and specifically to Chinese ships—and have even praised the Houthis as righteous fighters against evildoers (i.e., the U.S. and Israel). . . . A December 19 editorial in the Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece Global Times argued that the “crisis” in the Red Sea was a “butterfly effect” of the war in Gaza, and that the real problem was not the Houthis, but Israel—which refuses to agree to an immediate ceasefire—and perhaps above all, the U.S.

China provides security to no one, and its forces in the region prove irrelevant when put to the test.

Why, ask many Israelis, can’t we just end the war, let our children, siblings, and spouses finally come home, and get out the hostages? Azar Gat seeks to answer this question by looking at the possible costs of concluding hostilities precipitously, and breaking down some of the more specific arguments put forward by those who have despaired of continuing military operations in Gaza. He points to the case of the second intifada, in which the IDF not only ended the epidemic of suicide bombing, but effectively convinced—through application of military force—Fatah and other Palestinian factions to cease their terror war.

“What we haven’t achieved militarily in Gaza after a year-and-a-half probably can’t be achieved.” Two years passed from the outbreak of the second intifada until the launch of Operation Defensive Shield, [whose aim was] to reoccupy the West Bank, and another two years until the intifada was fully suppressed. And all of that, then as now, was conducted against the background of a mostly hostile international community and with significant American constraints (together with critical assistance) on Israeli action. The Israeli chief of staff recently estimated that the intensified Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip would take about two months. Let’s hope that is the case.

The results of the [current] operation in [Gaza] and the breaking of Hamas’s grip on the supply routes may indeed pave the way for the entry of a non-Hamas Palestinian administration into the Strip—an arrangement that would necessarily need to be backed by Israeli bayonets, as in the West Bank. Any other end to the war will lead to Hamas’s recovery and its return to control of Gaza.

It is unclear how much Hamas was or would be willing to compromise on these figures in negotiations. But since the hostages are its primary bargaining chip, it has no incentive to compromise. On the contrary—it is interested in dragging out negotiations indefinitely, insisting on the full evacuation of the Gaza Strip and an internationally guaranteed cease-fire, to ensure its survival as Gaza’s de-facto ruler—a position that would also guarantee access to the flood of international aid destined for the Gaza Strip.

Once the hostages become the exclusive focus of discussion, Hamas dictates the rules. And since not only 251 or twenty hostages, but any number is considered worth “any price,” there is a real concern that Hamas will retain a certain number of captives as a long-term reserve.