It’s hard to say with any certainty what motivated Canada’s arms embargo—anti-Semitism, or simple moral confusion, or something else—and in any case the question is largely academic. But something else happened in Canada just a little earlier this month: the country’s two largest kosher-certification agencies filed suit against the national government, claiming that recent regulations on kosher slaughter amount to a de-facto ban on the practice, which is crucial to Jewish life and religious observance. And it is especially damning that, unlike similar regulations in several European countries, these don’t affect the production of halal meat—only kosher meat.

Eric Grossman observes:

The new regulations . . . are, ostensibly, being put forward as a measure protecting animal welfare; however, selectively singling out Jewish slaughter as an odious treatment of animals has a long and ugly history, intimately intermingled with . . . anti-Semitism. As Jews, it is difficult not to feel targeted when governments go to great lengths to rationalize brutal practices of other groups but determine Jewish [observances] to be barbaric.

For instance, Grossman writes, seal clubbing is entirely legal in Canada—a practice that claims the lives of tens of thousands of Canadian pups every year. He adds:

As noted by Professor Dan Michman, head of the International Institute for Holocaust Research, “The Nazis perceived ritual slaughter not as a religious matter but, . . . as a manifestation of Jews’ cruel nature.” One hardly needs to highlight the bitter irony that the Nazis banned Jewish slaughter at the same time as they were preparing their slaughter of the Jews.

While I doubt many Canadian parliamentarians would make statements about the cruel nature of the Jews, the case against Israel ultimately rests on the assertion, or implication, that there is something especially cruel in the manner in which it defends itself. And it’s not as if anti-Semitism is unknown in Canada, as Grossman points out:

Among the many incidents that occurred last week alone, anti-Israel protestors descended upon Jewish neighborhoods in Toronto and Montreal, and angry mobs intimidated attendees of synagogues in both cities. Demonstrators surrounded the Jewish Federation building in Montreal and blocked participants attending a pro-Israel event from getting in or out for hours; . . . pro-Palestinian protestors in Ontario shouted, “Go back to Europe.”

Below, today’s newsletter will return to some other reflections on the one-year anniversary of the outbreak of the current war, but first something must be said of its recent progress. Israel has kept up its aerial and ground assault on Hizballah, and may have already killed the successor to Hassan Nasrallah, the longtime leader it eliminated less than two weeks ago. Matthew Levitt assesses the current state of the Lebanon-based terrorist group, which, in his view, is now “a shadow of its former self.” Indeed, he adds,

it is no exaggeration to say that the Hizballah of two weeks ago no longer exists. And since Hizballah was the backbone of Iran’s network of militant proxies, its so-called axis of resistance, Iran’s strategy of arming and deploying proxy groups throughout the region is suddenly at risk as well.

Hizballah’s attacks put increasing pressure on Israel, as intended, only that pressure did not lead Israelis to stop targeting Hamas so much as it chipped away at Israel’s fears about the cost of military action to address the military threats posed by Hizballah.

At the same time, Levitt explains, Hizballah still poses a serious threat, as it demonstrated last night when its missiles struck Haifa and Tiberias, injuring at least two people:

Hizballah still maintains an arsenal of rockets and a cadre of several thousand fighters. It will continue to pose potent military threats for Israel, Lebanon, and the wider region.

How will the group seek to avenge Nasrallah’s death amid these military setbacks? Hizballah is likely to resort to acts of international terrorism, which are overseen by one of the few elements of the group that has not yet lost key leaders.

But the true measure of whether the group will be able to reconstitute itself, even over many years, is whether Iran can restock Hizballah’s sophisticated arsenal. Tehran’s network of proxy groups—from Hizballah to Hamas to the Houthis—is only as dangerous as it is today because of Iran’s provision of weapons and money. Whatever Hizballah does next, Western governments must prioritize cutting off Tehran’s ability to arm and fund its proxies.